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Articles
DEFERENCE, CHENERY, AND FOIA
MARGARET B. KWOKA *
ABSTRACT
Litigation fails to check adequately agency secrecy decisions
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). To vindicate
the public’s right to know what its government is up to, the dynamic of FOIA litigation needs fundamental change. This Article
builds on previous work documenting that courts routinely defer
to agency decisions to withhold records from the public, despite
Congress’s clear mandate for de novo judicial review. In this Article, a paradox is revealed: while courts do not effectuate true de
novo review, they rely on that statutory standard to allow agencies to raise claims of exemption in litigation not relied on in the
agency’s response to a request for information. As a result, requesters end up in a worse position under de novo review than
they would have been if Congress had chosen deferential review
in FOIA cases. Given existing practice, FOIA’s goal of transparency would be best served by relocating FOIA within a more typical administrative law paradigm. Chiefly, it contends that the
observed deference justifies applying the Chenery principle to
FOIA litigation, which would preclude agencies from asserting
exemption claims for the first time in litigation. This Article
demonstrates that not only can the application of Chenery be justified doctrinally and theoretically, but also that the benefits of
constraining agency litigation positions outweigh potential costs,
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rendering FOIA litigation a more fundamentally fair process that
better advances the goals of FOIA.
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INTRODUCTION
FOIA represents one of the strongest government accountability
measures Congress has ever adopted, granting every person the right to access government records subject to only a small set of enumerated exemptions. 1 FOIA was the first law of its kind, but it has sparked an international wave of open records laws adopted in countries as disparate as France,2

1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
2. Loi 78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d’amélioration des relations entre
l’administration et le public et diverses dispositions d’ordre administratif, social et fiscal (Fr.) [Act
No. 78-753 on various measures for improved relations between the Civil Service and the public
and on various arrangements of administrative, social and fiscal nature], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 18, 1978, p. 2851, available at http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/4542/file/Loi_n%C2%B0_78753_measures_for_relations_Civil%20Service_and_public_am_2011_fr.pdf.
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Mexico, 3 and China, 4 and in international institutions such as the European
Union 5 and the United Nations.6 Access to information has been reconceptualized as a human right 7 and proclaimed fundamental to a democracy. 8
Despite the importance of access to information, Congress recognized
the need to protect other important interests such as privacy, national security, and trade secrets, and accordingly provided statutory exemptions from
mandatory disclosure. 9 When an agency invokes an exemption to deny access to requested records, the requester is entitled to challenge that decision
in court. 10 Despite these important competing interests, Congress believed
the goal of maximum transparency was so important that it mandated de
novo judicial review of any case challenging the government’s withholding
of records from the public. 11 As such, FOIA litigation is one of the few instances in which judges reviewing agency actions owe no deference to the
agency’s position. 12 FOIA’s strong review provision was meant to serve as
a check on agency power and to protect the public’s right to information.13
3. Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental [Federal
Transparency and Access to Public Government Information Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 11 de Junio de 2002 (Mex.), available at http://www.freedominfo.org/wpcontent/uploads/documents/mexico_ley.pdf.
4. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli [Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr.
5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), translated in THE CHINA LAW CENTER, YALE LAW SCHOOL
(Feb. 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-RegsEnglish.pdf.
5. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and certain related acts, art. 255(1), Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL:EN:PDF.
6. U.N. Hum. Res. Comm., General Comment 34, Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 18–19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).
7. See, e.g., CHERYL ANN BISHOP, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT 208
(2012); Patrick Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human
Rights?, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 214 (2006).
8. See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
1–2 (1976) (“[T]he right to know . . . is necessary for collective decision-making in a democratic
society.”).
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012) (listing exemptions to disclosure).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2012).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2012); 111 CONG. REC. APP A946-48 (1965) (statement of H.R.
Rep. Fascell); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1497, at 30 (1966) (“The proceedings are to be de novo so
that the court can consider the propriety of the withholding instead of being restricted to judicial
sanctioning of agency discretion.”).
12. See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 679, 712–13 (2002).
13. 112 CONG. REC. 13,659 (1966) (statement of Rep. Gallagher) (“One of the most important provisions of the bill is subsection C, which grants authority to the Federal district courts
to order production of records improperly withheld. This means that for the first time in the Gov-
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Not only does FOIA’s de novo review provision render FOIA litigation an outlier in administrative law with respect to standards of review, but
it also renders inapplicable other fundamental principles of administrative
law. 14 Most importantly, courts have unanimously concluded that FOIA
litigation is exempt from a longstanding administrative review doctrine—
the Chenery principle. 15 Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 16 most agency actions challenged in court must stand or fall on the justifications offered by
the agency at the time the decision was made, rather than any post-hoc rationalizations. 17 Chenery has the effect of constraining courts’ deference to
agency actions, affording deference only to the agency professionals’ contemporaneous judgments. 18 No consideration, much less deference, is owed
any new arguments lawyers might make in the course of litigation.19 In
FOIA cases, however, because Chenery does not apply, the agency’s lawyers, almost always housed not in the defending agency but in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), are free to advance any arguments they see fit,
whether or not they were relied on during the administrative process.20
While the standards employed in FOIA litigation seem clear and the
exceptional treatment of these cases is facially reasonable, the reality of
FOIA litigation reveals a much more complex—and ultimately problematic—picture of judicial review under FOIA. Despite the formal de novo
standard of review, courts routinely give great deference to agencies’ positions in FOIA litigation: courts both explicitly defer to certain types of government representations that are critical to the determination of whether the
public has a right of access to records and implicitly defer to agencies by
giving them special procedural advantages such as displacing discovery and
making trials effectively unavailable.21 Perhaps, even more surprisingly,
empirical evidence suggests that courts may be giving substantially more
deference to agencies in FOIA cases than in other types of litigation, as evidenced by a significantly higher affirmance rate of agency FOIA withhold-

ernment’s history, a citizen will no longer be at the end of the road when his request for a Government document arbitrarily has been turned down by some bureaucrat.”).
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
17. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196; Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 87.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012); see also Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 795 F.2d 205, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Starr, J., dissenting) (noting that FOIA litigators may advance exemptions never contemplated by agency experts).
21. Margaret B. Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 211–35 (2013).
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ing decisions than other agency actions, which are explicitly entitled to deferential review. 22
When courts’ practical deference in FOIA cases is combined with their
refusal to apply the Chenery principle to FOIA review, it results in a perverse litigation dynamic: agencies get the benefit of deference, but are not
constrained by Chenery’s requirement that they rely on the reasons they articulated to the requesters in the first instance. Instead, courts in FOIA cases are applying the same deferential principles to any argument advanced,
whether it is rooted in the justification the agency relied on at the time of
the decision or whether it was first advanced by the lawyers representing
the agency in litigation. Requesters, however, are getting the worst of both
worlds. They have an uphill battle to convince the court of their positions,
and the rationale they are fighting may have changed by the time the litigation crystallizes.
FOIA litigation, therefore, exists in the vacuum between the ideal
Congress set out for it—true de novo review—and the judicial review regime applied to the vast majority of agency actions, which incorporates
both deference doctrines and the constraint of the Chenery principle. Certainly, restoring true de novo judicial review in FOIA cases would implement the intent of Congress to protect the right of the public to access the
maximum possible amount of government information without infringing
on the important interests protected by the exemptions to disclosure. 23
FOIA’s history and precedent, however, suggest serious barriers to this
remedy: Congress has tried before to restore de novo review without significant success; judges and litigants feel constrained by precedent; courts exhibit understandable reluctance to second-guess certain types of agency representations; and much of the deference given is difficult to identify, much
less correct. 24 Given the constraints that impede achieving true de novo review, the next best alternative for FOIA litigation is not the current regime
under which courts act as if de novo review is possible but fall short.25 Rather, the next best alternative is to shift our thinking wholesale to a more
typical administrative review scenario. 26
This Article posits that reconceptualizing FOIA litigation as within the
normal administrative law paradigm offers an avenue to fixing FOIA litiga22. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 169 (2010) (reporting affirmance rates across agencies, standards of review, and types of cases as falling between sixty
and seventy percent); Verkuil, supra note 12, at 719 (reporting a ninety percent affirmance rate in
FOIA cases).
23. See Kwoka, supra note 21, at 196–200 (documenting the legislative history evidencing
Congress’s intent to provide strong judicial oversight).
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part II.B.
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tion. 27 Under this reconceptualization, because courts are in practice already deferring to agency decisions to withhold records under FOIA, the
Chenery principle would apply to constrain the rationales that receive deferential treatment to those articulated by the agency at the time the decision
was made and by the agency professionals responsible for the administration of transparency laws. 28 To develop this proposal, Part I describes the
paradox of FOIA litigation: while FOIA’s status as an exception to typical
administrative law review principles was meant to ensure more stringent
judicial oversight concerning agency secrecy, in practice it has resulted in
deeply unbalanced litigation strongly favoring such secrecy. Part II employs the theoretical justifications for Chenery, including the inextricable
link between Chenery and deference to agency actions, to demonstrate that
Chenery’s application to FOIA cases is justified. Lastly, Part III explores
how Chenery would operate in FOIA litigation to maximize government
transparency as intended by Congress, both in litigation and at the administrative level.
I. THE FOIA LITIGATION PARADOX
FOIA affords every person the right to request and receive copies of
any government agency’s records, subject only to nine exemptions enumerated in the statute.29 Those exemptions protect certain important public and
private interests, including national security, law enforcement investigations, personal privacy, confidential commercial or financial information,
and agency deliberations.30 If an agency wants to respond to a FOIA request by withholding some or all of the requested records pursuant to one of
the exemptions, it must send the requester a denial letter that states the reasons for the denial and explains the right of a requester to administratively
appeal the denial.31 If the requester follows the appeals process and is again
denied, she may then bring a lawsuit challenging the denial in federal district court. 32 Alternatively, if the agency fails to timely respond either to the
initial request or the administrative appeal, the requester may proceed di-

27. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part III.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012); see also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
30. See id. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (exempting from mandatory disclosure records that are (1)
properly classified under an executive order, (2) related solely to internal personnel rules, (3) exempt from disclosure by another statute, (4) trade secrets or confidential commercial information,
(5) not discoverable in ordinary civil litigation against the agency, (6) going to cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy if disclosed, (7) within certain categories of law enforcement
records, (8) related to certain banking matters, and (9) regarding the location of wells).
31. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A).
32. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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rectly to federal court as if she received a final denial from the agency. 33
Either way, once in court, the principle issue in FOIA cases is whether
withheld records (or portions thereof) fall within one of the exemptions to
disclosure or whether the requester has a right to access them under FOIA. 34
FOIA litigation currently stands as an anomaly in administrative law in
at least two principle respects. First, rather than any of the myriad deferential standards usually associated with review of agency actions—be it deference afforded under the principles announced in Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 35 Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 36 Auer v.
Robbins, 37 or deference under statutory standards such as arbitrary and capricious, substantial evidence, or other iterations—for FOIA cases the statute itself provides that “the court shall determine the matter de novo.” 38
Thus, in reviewing a denial under FOIA, courts owe agencies no deference
with respect to the agency’s fact-finding, legal interpretations, or application of law to facts. 39 Rather, courts must look at the matter as if deciding it
in the first instance. 40 Second, because of this standard of review, another
nearly ubiquitous administrative law doctrine fails to be invoked: the
Chenery principle. 41 Under the Chenery principle, agencies’ decisions can
only be affirmed on the grounds articulated by the agency at the time the
decision was made. 42 Unlike in other administrative cases, in FOIA cases
an agency may advance any argument in litigation to defend its position,
whether or not relied upon at the time of the denial. 43
The paradox of FOIA litigation becomes clear, however, when the
myth of de novo review is revealed.44 Because courts in effect have created
a unique system of deference in FOIA cases, requesters fail to reap the benefit of the de novo review standard on the books. 45 Meanwhile, agencies
take advantage of the opportunity to raise any and all arguments in favor of
affirmance, often changing their justifications as the dispute proceeds.46 As
33. Id. § 552(a)(4)(C)(1).
34. See id. § 552(a)(4).
35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
36. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
37. 519 U.S. 452 (1991).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Zaring, supra note 22, at 160 (describing various deferential standards of review employed in administrative law and noting that de novo review is not
“at the heart of administrative law”).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
40. Id.
41. Louis v. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2005).
42. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
43. See infra Parts II.B–C.
44. See infra Part I.A.
45. See infra Part I.B.
46. See infra Part I.C.
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this Article demonstrates, the end result grossly distorts the litigation in favor of agency secrecy and fails to provide the meaningful judicial check on
agencies’ FOIA decisions that Congress intended. 47
A. The Myth of De Novo Review
Without question, de novo review is the standard on the books. 48
Moreover, the legislative history of FOIA shows that Congress was
thoughtful and deliberate when it chose de novo review, wanting courts to
have meaningful oversight over agency secrecy decisions and to act as a
protector of the public’s right to maximum access to information. 49 In fact,
many in Congress believed the strong judicial review provision was one of
FOIA’s most important features. 50
Under a conventional understanding of standards of review, the expectation is that fewer agency actions scrutinized de novo should be affirmed
than those agency actions treated deferentially. 51 After all, when courts defer to agencies, some number of cases should be affirmed even though the
court itself would have come out a different way had it addressed the question in the first instance.52 This distinction is precisely why Congress understood its choice of de novo review in FOIA cases to be meaningful.53
Despite the clarity of Congress’s choice of standard of review in FOIA
cases, empirical evidence suggests that courts are not actually applying a
true de novo standard in reviewing agency decisions to withhold records.
In the leading study, which examined all district court FOIA decisions over
a ten-year period, agency denials of information under FOIA were affirmed
in a full ninety percent of cases decided, despite the stringent de novo

47. See infra Part I.C.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (2012).
49. For a detailed account of the legislative history of the standard of review provision in
FOIA, see Kwoka, supra note 21, at 196–200.
50. See supra note 13.
51. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999); Verkuil, supra note 12, at 692; Zaring,
supra note 22, at 136–38.
52. See Zaring, supra note 22, at 136–38 (describing the presumed distinctions between
standards of review).
53. See Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 840 F.2d 26, 31 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (observing that de novo review “exerts a profound effect upon the amount of respect the court must yield
to agency determinations”), vacated on other grounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rizzo v.
Tyler, 438 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that de novo review “reflects Congress’s
intent to provide greater judicial scrutiny over an agency’s FOIA determinations than over other
agency rulings”); 120 CONG. REC. 36, 626 (1974) (statement of Rep. Reid) (“The courts, in my
view, have a duty to look behind any claim of exemption, which all too often in the past has been
used to cover up inefficiency or embarrassment even in foreign policy matters which, many times,
are fully known by other countries but not printable in our own—supposedly the most democratic
and most open in the world.”).
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standard of review. 54 By contrast, other agency actions, almost always reviewed deferentially by the courts, are affirmed only sixty to seventy percent of the time. 55 This result is, of course, the precise opposite of what one
would expect based on our understanding of how standards of review
should affect case outcomes. 56 The ninety percent affirmance rate in FOIA
cases is inconsistent with the de novo review in which courts claim to engage in these cases. 57
As I have argued elsewhere, the reality of FOIA litigation exposes
strong deference that has crept into FOIA jurisprudence. 58 I divided this
system of deference into two sets of practices, which I labeled “spoken” and
“unspoken” deference. 59 The spoken deference category encompasses instances in which courts expressly defer to agency positions on a relevant
question in a FOIA case. 60 Unspoken deference refers to seemingly neutral
procedural rulings exercised routinely as a matter of discretion in FOIA litigation, but which cumulatively have the effect of preventing meaningful
challenges to the government’s positions in FOIA litigation and thus preventing true de novo review. 61
One example of spoken deference arises in litigation over agency
claims that records are exempt from FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provisions because they have been properly classified to protect national security
interests. 62 While national security is an area in which the judiciary has historically deferred to the political branches, Congress’s de novo review provision in FOIA was meant to apply equally to national security based

54. Verkuil, supra note 12, at 713.
55. See Zaring, supra note 22, at 169 (“For Chevron review, Skidmore review, and arbitrary
and capricious review, the studies suggest that, at least as the judiciary is currently comprised,
agencies win between 60 and 70% of their appeals with few exceptions.”).
56. Verkuil, supra note 12, at 713.
57. See id. at 730 (“FOIA cases are hard if not impossible to explain in terms of outcomes
analysis if de novo is to be a meaningful standard of review.”); see also Zaring, supra note 22, at
176 n.134 (noting that Verkuil’s finding is “surprising” in light of his own research indicating that
agencies are affirmed at approximately the same rates across types of decisions, standards of review, and agencies involved). Leading theories of dispute resolution, including predispute selection effects and settlement rates, likewise cannot explain the astronomical affirmance rate in FOIA
cases. Kwoka, supra note 21, at 206–11.
58. See generally Kwoka, supra note 21 (arguing that courts generally defer to the government despite reciting a de novo standard of review in FOIA cases).
59. Id. at 211.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. These claims are made under FOIA’s exemption 1, which exempts records that are “(A)
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012).
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claims of exemption as it does to other exemption claims. 63 In 1974
amendments to FOIA, Congress even legislatively overruled the Supreme
Court’s invocation of deference to national security based FOIA denials by
amending the exemption based on classification to make clear the courts
were to review whether withheld records are classified properly. 64
Despite the clarity of Congress’s intent, courts have routinely deferred
to agency FOIA denials based on national security, declaring that courts
must affirm a national security denial so long as the record “‘logically falls
into the category of the exemption indicated,’ and there is no evidence of
bad faith on the part of the agency.” 65 One recent U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit decision was even more blunt: “[T]his Court must adopt
a deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview of national security.” 66 Commentators agree that national security
claims are not truly reviewed de novo by the courts,67 and DOJ has issued
guidance to agencies declaring that, “courts generally have heavily deferred
to agency expertise in national security cases.”68 Supporting this view, one
DOJ report found not a single ultimately successful challenge to an agency’s national security exemption claim under FOIA, 69 and a later empirical
study revealed that there was likewise no successful challenge over a tenyear period studied in the 1990s. 70

63. The standard of review provision in FOIA is the same for all claims of exemption. Id.
§ 552(a)(4)(B).
64. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), superseded by
statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (amending the 1967 Freedom of Information Act). In fact, Congress’s conviction on this point was so strong that Congress
overrode President Ford’s veto of the legislation reinstating de novo review of national security
claims under FOIA. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1190–91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“In 1974 Congress overrode a presidential veto and amended the FOIA for the express purpose of changing this
aspect of the Mink case.”); 120 CONG. REC. 36, 243 (1974) (veto message from President Ford).
65. Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 555–56 (1st Cir. 1993).
66. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 76 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67. See, e.g., Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing
Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 165 (2006) (“In a subtle but telling shift of nomenclature, the D.C. Circuit . . . called the standard of review in [national security] cases [under
FOIA] ‘the substantial weight standard’ rather than the de novo standard of review mandated by
Congress.”); Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information
Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2004) (explaining that, in regard to national security claims
under FOIA, “[courts] effectively apply something less” than “de novo review”).
68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 147 (2009)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO FOIA].
69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT
OVERVIEW 83–86 (2000).
70. Verkuil, supra note 12, at 715 n.159.
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National security is not the only realm in which spoken deference arises under FOIA. Courts engage in spoken deference in assessing agency
claims under at least two other of the Act’s nine exemptions to disclosure. 71
First, when invoking the law enforcement exemption, courts have routinely
deferred to agencies’ claims that records were “compiled for law enforcement purposes,” a threshold inquiry under the exemption.72 This deference
is granted to agencies whose primary activities are law enforcement related 73 and, in some circuits, the agency’s status as a law enforcement agency
itself is accepted as conclusive proof that the records meet this requirement. 74 Second, although not yet embraced by a precedential opinion, some
district courts have deferred to agencies’ representations about their own
decisionmaking process as part of the review of the agency’s claim that records are exempt under the deliberative process privilege. 75 Where a record
falls within the decisionmaking process (as part of deliberations versus justifying a final decision) is a critical inquiry concerning whether the privilege applies. 76 As each of these examples shows, spoken deference applies

71. In addition to exemptions 1, 5, and 7, some courts have deferred to agency positions taken under exemption 3, which exempts records covered under other statutes, on the theory that the
agencies are charged with interpreting those other statutes and those interpretations are entitled to
either Chevron or Skidmore deference. See, e.g., Landmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132,
1137 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Skidmore deference to the IRS’s nonbinding interpretation of an
exemption 3 statute); Lehrfeld v. Richardson, 132 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying
Chevron deference to a binding regulation interpreting an exemption 3 statute). Whether this interpretation of exemption 3 in conjunction with the other referenced statutes is correct is still an
open question. See A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (documenting a circuit split).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012) (exempting “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” when release of the records would produce one of the enumerated harms
listed under the exemption).
73. Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying a presumption that an
agency operates within its delegated purpose and, therefore, requiring “less exacting proof” that
records were compiled for law enforcement purposes from agencies whose primary function is
law enforcement); see also Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that
Pratt adopts a “deferential” approach to law enforcement agencies).
74. See, e.g., Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2011) (adopting
the so-called “per se” rule that any records compiled by an agency whose primary function is law
enforcement were compiled for law enforcement purposes). In addition to deferring to agencies’
representations about whether records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, the D.C. Circuit has deferred to agency positions with respect to other inquiries relevant under exemption 7.
See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (deferring to the agency’s representations that release of records would interfere with a law enforcement
investigation with potential national security implications).
75. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118
(D.D.C. 1984) (“There should be considerable deference to the [agency’s] judgment as to what
constitutes . . . part of the agency give-and-take—of the deliberative process—by which the decision itself is made.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
76. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (describing the deliberative process privilege).
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not only to a relevant question, but often the relevant question that will determine if a claimed exemption to disclosure applies or whether the records
must be released.
While spoken deference affects a substantial subset of the claims
agencies might invoke to withhold records under FOIA, unspoken deference affects them all. Through a series of procedural decisions that have
become the norm in FOIA litigation, the government has gained great litigation advantages. 77 Many of these practices were developed in response to
some unique features of FOIA litigation, namely that the governmentdefendant bears the burden to prove that an exemption to disclosure applies 78 and that there is an inherent information imbalance between the parties insofar as the government has access to the disputed records and the requester does not. 79 Despite courts’ seemingly benign intentions, these
procedural practices have the effect of deferring to the government’s secrecy positions in FOIA litigation. 80
First, courts have largely replaced the default system of civil discovery
in FOIA cases, having categorically declared it to be inappropriate in FOIA
cases because of the nature of the information imbalance.81 In its stead,
courts have operated under a presumption that the only discovery necessary
in FOIA litigation is the government’s production of an affidavit known as
the Vaughn index, which lists the withheld records, claimed exemptions,
and short justifications. 82 These indices, however, have become exercises
in boilerplate affidavit writing and, in any event, do not allow the requester
to probe the veracity of the government’s representations through cross examination or multiple depositions.83 As a result, unless the government’s
affidavit is facially flawed or inadequate, and so long as the requester cannot produce evidence of actual bad faith on the part of the government (as is
usually the case), the contents of the affidavit will be accepted as true by the

77. See infra notes 81–92 and accompanying text.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (2012).
79. For a full accounting of unspoken deference and its origins, see Kwoka, supra note 21, at
221–35.
80. See infra notes 94–95.
81. See Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining that
“[d]iscovery is generally unavailable in FOIA actions”).
82. See Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Vaughn indices are sometimes
necessary because ordinary rules of discovery cannot be followed in FOIA cases where the issue
is whether one party is entitled to non-disclosed documents.”); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352
& n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (using the Vaughn procedure to justify the denial of further discovery).
Courts sometimes articulate possible scenarios that would justify discovery, but those scenarios
are extremely unlikely to actually arise in real FOIA litigation. See Kwoka, supra note 21, at
227–28.
83. Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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court. 84 Thus, the inability to mount a serious challenge results in judicial
deference to the government’s assertions about the justifications for secrecy.
Second, courts have altered the normal procedures concerning summary judgment in a way that insulates the government’s assertions from de
novo scrutiny. 85 In FOIA litigation, rather than using summary judgment to
weed out cases without genuine disputes of material fact, courts employ
summary judgment to decide essentially all cases, as a routine matter.86
This use of summary judgment is neither warranted nor neutral. 87 Factual
disputes that affect the outcome of the case—not pertaining to the contents
of the requested records themselves—do arise with frequency in FOIA cases. 88 These disputes include why a document was prepared, how it was
used, with whom it was shared, or disputes about the predicted effects of
releasing the document such as whether release would interfere with an ongoing investigation or would contribute to the public’s understanding of the
operations of government. 89 Refusing to allow cases to go to trial on these
questions, and instead resolving factual disputes at the summary judgment
stage, ends up depriving the requester of meaningful opportunities to focus
the judge’s attention on the important aspects of the dispute, cross-examine
the government’s witnesses, and otherwise test the strength of the government’s case. 90
What is more, courts have routinely adopted a practice of allowing the
government a second crack at summary judgment when it fails to adequately oppose a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion the first time around,
even though the government bears the burden to demonstrate sufficient evi-

84. Kwoka, supra note 21, at 226.
85. Interestingly, many of the same procedural distortions have been documented in the adjudication of qualified immunity defenses to constitutional tort actions, including limiting discovery, altering burdens of proof, deciding questions of fact, and allowing serial motions for summary
judgment. Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role
of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 84–98 (1998).
86. Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 259–
60 (2011) (reporting empirical findings that FOIA cases are almost never resolved at trial, representing 0.71% of all FOIA dispositions as compared with 3.44% of dispositions in other civil cases, and that FOIA cases are overwhelmingly resolved on motion, representing 38.09% of all FOIA
dispositions as compared with 12.08% of dispositions in other civil cases); see also Miscavige v.
IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Generally, FOIA cases should be handled on motions for
summary judgment, once the documents in issue are properly identified.”).
87. Kwoka, supra note 86, at 227–44 (detailing the myriad factual disputes that FOIA cases
regularly present).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 264–67, 273–76 (demonstrating that plaintiffs may fare better at trial than on summary judgment using interviews with attorneys who have conducted FOIA trials and some empirical evidence concerning outcomes of past FOIA trials).
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dence to sustain its claim. 91 In any other context, a party who bears the
burden of proof and who fails to produce sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable fact-finder could find in his favor in opposition to a summary
judgment motion would have a judgment entered against him. 92 Allowing
the government multiple bites of the summary judgment apple and resolving genuine factual disputes on summary judgment motions are practices
that not only fail to incentivize the government to put forth its best case in
the first instance, thus dragging out the litigation, but also deprive the requester of meaningful procedural opportunities, and even of the judgments
to which they are entitled under normal litigation rules.
The end result of this collection of practices is deference to the government in FOIA litigation, but it is not easily classifiable into one of the
types of deference used in other areas of administrative law. Certainly, it is
not Chevron type deference, as no particular agency is charged with interpreting ambiguities in FOIA 93 and, in any case, FOIA denial letters lack the
“force of law” necessary to entitle them to such deference.94 Some aspects
of FOIA deference resemble arbitrary and capricious review used with respect to fact-finding in informal agency adjudications, 95 insofar as courts
openly defer to agencies’ factual representations or accept representations
in Vaughn indices, but “arbitrary or capricious” has never been articulated
as a standard in FOIA cases. Indeed, many of the deference doctrines under
FOIA seem even more forceful than arbitrary or capricious review, because
the courts in some FOIA cases accept the agencies’ factual representations
absolutely so long as there is no evidence of bad faith, which may be more
akin to the deference courts give to agencies’ interpretations of their own
regulations under Auer. 96 On the other hand, the types of procedural advantages that agencies enjoy in FOIA litigation have no analog in other
91. See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d. 157, 175
(D.D.C. 2011) (allowing the government to submit a renewed motion for summary judgment);
Clemente v. FBI, 741 F. Supp. 2d 64, 89 (D.D.C. 2010) (same); Schoenman v. FBI, 604 F. Supp.
2d 174, 204 (D.D.C. 2009) (same).
92. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment based on plaintiff’s lack of sufficient evidence).
93. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (setting out a deference standard that applies when an agency interprets a statute it administers).
94. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (noting that some informal
rulings “‘do not carry the force of law and are not, like regulations, intended to clarify the rights
and obligations of importers beyond the specific case under review’”).
95. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (applying arbitrary and capricious review to an informal adjudication), abrogated on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
96. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining that agencies’ interpretations
of their own regulations are “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’”).
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parts of administrative law. Instead, FOIA jurisprudence appears to have
created its own deference doctrine through a collection of practices that
have the end result of deferring to the agencies’ positions.
While a facial anomaly, deference under FOIA can also be understood
as just one more in a long line of variants on deference used in the context
of administrative law.97 Recent scholarship has called into serious question
whether there is a meaningful difference between the multitude of standards
of review employed in administrative law, each of which purports to embody a different sort of deference. 98 Empirical evidence suggests that,
across the board, courts exhibit a similar level of deference to agencies irrespective of the formal deferential standard employed. 99 The seemingly new
variant on deference to agencies exhibited in FOIA case law may only
amount to new vocabulary for the same type of deferential treatment of
agencies courts employ in other contexts.
B. Courts’ Refusal to Apply Chenery to FOIA Cases
In addition to FOIA’s formal de novo review standard, FOIA stands as
an exception to the norms of administrative law in another crucial way: as
an exception to the application of the Chenery principle. 100 There is no disagreement among the courts about the application of Chenery to FOIA litigation: it does not apply. 101 In fact, Chenery’s inapplicability to FOIA cases is so uncontroversial that there are few arguments advanced or
challenges made asserting the application of Chenery under FOIA and few
decisions dealing with the question in depth. In short, Chenery’s inextricable link to deference doctrines virtually mandates, in the view of the courts,
that it not apply when courts review agency decisions to withhold records
under FOIA under a de novo standard.

97. For a summary of the variants of deference used in administrative law review, see Zaring,
supra note 22, at 143–53.
98. See, e.g., id. at 153–69 (arguing that six different standards of review in administrative
law all boil down to a review for reasonableness of the agency action); Ronald M. Levin, The
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1271 (1997) (noting
that the D.C. Circuit recognizes little meaningful difference between Chevron step two and State
Farm); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 761, 764 (2008) (noting that review of agency factfinding under “the substantial evidence
standard” is essentially the same as arbitrary and capricious review); Matthew C. Stephenson &
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598–99, 604 n.28 (2009) (arguing that the single question Chevron really asks is whether the agency’s statutory interpretation
is reasonable, and that this question is not very different from “hard look” review under State
Farm).
99. Zaring, supra note 22, at 169.
100. For an overview of the Chenery principle, see infra Part II.A.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 102–112.
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The Ninth Circuit has provided one of the rare in-depth discussions rejecting a claim that Chenery should apply to FOIA. In Louis v. United
States Department of Labor, 102 the court considered a challenge to an agency’s decision to withhold records under the Privacy Act, 103 a complimentary
law to FOIA that contains many parallel provisions regarding disclosure obligations and identical provisions for judicial review of agency decisions to
keep records secret. 104 The Department of Labor (“DOL”) had promulgated
a rule invoking a provision of the Privacy Act that allows an agency to refuse disclosure of certain systems of records.105 When the plaintiff requested certain records, the DOL relied on that rule to deny the request. 106 Once
the plaintiff sued, however, the DOL raised the alternative argument that it
was entitled to withhold the records under the deliberative process privilege, which is a basis for invoking one of the Privacy Act exemptions to
disclosure. 107
Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the agency, the Ninth Circuit first invalidated the Department’s rule on the ground
that the agency had failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act’s (“APA”) notice and comment requirements.108 Then, the district
court considered the deliberative process claim, raised for the first time in
the district court proceeding. The plaintiff argued that the agency was not
entitled to rely on a new theory to justify withholding the record because
doing so would violate Chenery. 109 The court concluded that Chenery did
not apply to Privacy Act or FOIA claims precisely because decisions made
under these acts are reviewed de novo and the agency’s determination is entitled to no deference. 110 Chenery, the court said, “was premised on the policy that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency”
when reviewing decisions that Congress “exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.” 111 The court went on to explain that decisions under
the Privacy Act and FOIA are not entrusted to a particular agency, but rather are mandated to be reviewed by courts de novo. 112

102. 419 F.3d 970, 977–79 (9th Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 972.
104. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (FOIA), with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (the Privacy Act).
105. Louis, 419 F.3d at 973–74.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 973.
108. Id. at 977.
109. Id.
110. A second rationale was articulated that is specific to the Privacy Act. Id. at 977. The
court concluded that the agency could not be said to have passively waived the argument given the
structure of the particular records request provision in the Privacy Act, as opposed to FOIA. Id.
111. Id. at 977–78.
112. Id. at 978.
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Other decisions have likewise relied on the de novo nature of judicial
review under FOIA to reject claims that Chenery should apply. One court
explained that:
Although plaintiff’s assertion [that Chenery precludes the agency
from raising a new exemption claim in court that was not relied
on in the administrative denial] may have merit when the court
engages in limited judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence standards of the APA, neither the
cases cited nor the rationale of limited judicial intrusion into
agency decision-making support the application of that principle
to de novo determinations of FOIA requests. 113
Another court noted that, “unlike in other administrative-law contexts,
the [agency’s] failure to consistently assert the applicability of FOIA exemption 6 at the agency level does not bar it from relying on that exemption
here.” 114
An examination of so-called reverse FOIA cases makes it even more
apparent that de novo review is the defining feature of FOIA litigation
courts rely on to preclude the application of Chenery in regular FOIA cases.
Reverse FOIA cases are cases in which the agency has decided to release
records in response to a FOIA request, but a third-party sues to prevent disclosure to protect their own interest in the records.115 FOIA only allows an
action to compel disclosure, not to compel secrecy, and thus reverse FOIA
cases must be brought under the APA. 116 Courts review decisions to release
records challenged in reverse FOIA cases under an arbitrary and capricious
standard in accordance with the APA. 117 Precisely because de novo review
does not apply to these cases, courts have not hesitated to apply the
Chenery principle. 118 For instance, in one reverse-FOIA suit, the United
113. Cook v. Watt, 597 F. Supp. 545, 548 (D. Alaska 1983) (internal citation omitted). Although the court relied on exemption 5 of FOIA at the administrative level, only attorney-client
and deliberative process privileges were cited, rather than the work-product privilege the agency
later raised in court. Id. at 547 & n.2.
114. Kalwasinski v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 08 Civ. 9593, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62659,
at *21 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2010).
115. See CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1133 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting
that “Reverse-FOIA actions,” in which an information submitter sues to challenge an agency’s
decision to release records requested under FOIA, are commonplace and are brought under the
APA).
116. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979).
117. United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 601 F.3d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Canadian
Commercial Corp. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
118. Data Prompt, Inc. v. Cisneros, No. 94-5133, 1995 WL 225725, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 5,
1995) (“Without deciding whether [the newly invoked regulation] would permit the same decision
[to disclose the requested records], we reject appellee’s argument as an impermissible post-hoc
rationalization. An agency’s administrative decision must stand or fall upon the reasoning advanced by the agency therein.”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and remanded
an agency decision to disclose records when the agency’s initial decision
rested on an out-of-date regulation, even though in litigation the agency
provided a current regulation that it claimed justified the same result. 119
Thus, when de novo review does not apply, even in the FOIA context,
Chenery is properly invoked. 120 It is not without some irony that Chenery
constrains agencies’ decisions to release records, increasing the likelihood
that decisions to promote maximum transparency in line with FOIA’s purpose will be overturned, but not to agency decisions to keep records secret.
It is tempting to think that the doctrine of waiver in litigation would
serve to mitigate any unfairness. Certainly, even though the Chenery principle does not apply, courts have acknowledged that the government in a
FOIA case waives a claim of exemption by failing to timely raise it in the
course of the judicial proceedings. 121 Nonetheless, given its limited application and acknowledged exceptions, the waiver doctrine is no substitute
for Chenery in the FOIA context. 122
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. United States Department of
Justice 123 provides a good illustration. There, the court considered an exemption claim that was not raised by the agency at the administrative level,

1394, 1403–04 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We can give no weight to Messier’s separate affidavit that was
submitted to the district court. . . . [W]hile giving reasons why exemption 4 should not be applied,
the affidavit does not attribute those reasons to the Commission as of the date of its decision. If
we relied on it in reviewing that decision, we would be violating the principle of [Chenery].”);
Jurewicz v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 891 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Chenery in refusing to consider an agency’s potential reliance on discretion to release records where the agency
articulated the only basis for disclosure that no exemption applied), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir
2014); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Pena, Civ. A. No. 92-2780-TFH, 1993 WL 786964, at *6
(D.D.C. Sept. 2, 1993) (applying Chenery to limit inquiry as to whether the agency misapprehended the law).
119. Data Prompt, 1995 WL 225725, at *2.
120. Not inconsistent with this approach, the Ninth Circuit has also applied a Chenery principle (without citing Chenery) to litigation over an agency’s refusal to grant a public interest waiver
of FOIA processing fees. See Friends of the Coast Fork v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 110 F.3d 53,
55 (9th Cir. 1997) (“On judicial review, we cannot consider new reasons offered by the agency
not raised in the denial letter.”). The Ninth Circuit later distinguished fee waiver determinations
on the grounds that the statutory review provision limits a court’s inquiry on such determinations
to “‘the record before the agency.’” Louis v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir.
2005) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii)). This is akin to the Supreme Court’s alternative rationale for invoking the Chenery rule in Overton Park, relying on the APA provisions requiring
review on the “whole record” before the agency. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 n.30 (1971) (“‘In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964)), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
121. See infra note 129.
122. See infra notes 129–131.
123. 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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the district court level, or in the initial court of appeals proceedings, but rather was relied on for the first time in a petition for rehearing en banc. 124
Citing FOIA’s judicial review provision, the court explained that the government has the burden of proof to establish that an exemption applies,
thereby requiring the government to specifically state and support each exemption claim in the district court. 125 The court concluded that “[a]n agency cannot prevail on an exemption that it has not raised either at the agency
level or in the district court and that it has invoked for the first time in the
appellate court.” 126 In a subsequent case, the D.C. Circuit refused to allow
the government to raise a new claim of exemption for the first time on remand to the district court, explaining that “an agency must identify the specific statutory exemptions relied upon, and do so at least by the time of the
district court proceedings.” 127 Accordingly, the government’s new claim of
exemption had been waived. 128 Other cases have followed suit, preventing
new claims of exemption raised after the initial district court proceedings.129
The waiver doctrine, moreover, is subject to exceptions, resulting in
courts allowing agencies to raise new arguments even after litigation has
been ongoing or has reached the appellate court level in certain instances.
In Jordan, the D.C. Circuit mentioned two possible situations warranting
reliance on a late-invoked exemption: first, there might be a change in the
law; and second, there may be an excusable mistake which, if not excused,
would lead to disclosure of material whose value is “obviously high,” such
as national security information. 130 Thus, the waiver doctrine still allows
agencies to rely on exemptions not invoked at the agency level so long as

124. Id. at 779.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Am. Immigration Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 905 F.2d 206, 217
n.2 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that the agency had waived reliance on a particular exemption when it
failed to raise it in its Vaughn index and its opening brief, and mentioning it only in a footnote in
its reply brief).
130. Jordan, 591 F.2d at 780; see also August v. FBI, 328 F.3d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing the government to change its position based on human error and the change in policy that
resulted); Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 795 F.2d 205, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(explaining that Jordan recognized two exceptions to the waiver rule, but finding that neither applied in the instant case); Hiken v. Dep’t of Def., 872 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(allowing the government to change exemption claims based on changes in FOIA law); Judicial
Watch v. Dep’t of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123–24 (D.D.C. 2006) (allowing an intervenor to
raise new exemption claims well into the litigation when failure to do so earlier was fault of the
government); Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574,
580–81 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding that the government was allowed to change its exemption claims
well into the litigation based on changed events).
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they are raised in the district court level, and it even allows those exemptions to be raised for the first time later in some circumstances.131
C. FOIA Litigation Dynamics
What, then, does the failure to apply Chenery to FOIA cases mean for
FOIA litigation? At base, it means that agencies need not adhere to the reasons for having denied the request for records at the outset, or even on administrative appeal. Once an agency is sued in court, the agencies’ lawyers
can make any arguments for withholding government documents they think
have the most likelihood of success. As one judge explained, “litigators . . .
are blissfully free to advance exemptions never contemplated by the experts
back home at the agency; the wondrous land of FOIA is a long way from
Chenery territory.” 132
A review of litigated cases shows that government attorneys take advantage of the flexibility that comes from not being constrained by
Chenery. For example, in one case, an environmental group requested inundation maps for areas downstream from the Hoover and Glen Canyon
dams, including those reflecting flooding that would result from dam failures. 133 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation denied the request on the sole basis that the records were exempt from disclosure under FOIA’s exemption
2, which covers records “‘related solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of the agency.’” 134 The environmental group sued. In the district
court proceedings, the agency maintained its exemption 2 claim, but added
a claim that withholding these records was also permitted under exemption
7(F), which exempts records compiled for law enforcement purposes the
release of which “could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual.”135 Because Chenery did not apply, the

131. See Jordan, 591 F.2d at 780.
132. Wash. Post, Co., 795 F.2d at 210 (Starr, J., dissenting); see also Young v. CIA, 972 F.2d
536, 538 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency does not waive FOIA exemptions by not raising them during the administrative process.”).
133. Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (D. Utah
2003).
134. Id. at 1316–1317 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)). At the time, many circuits had recognized two types of exemption 2 claims, referred to as “high 2” and “low 2” exemptions. Id. at
1317. The government claimed “high 2,” which referred to instances in which not only were the
records directed internally, but also in which the release of the records would risk circumvention
of the law. Id.; see also Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051,
1074 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing for the first time the “high 2” exemption). The “high 2” exemption has subsequently been rejected by the Supreme Court. See Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy,
131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2012); Living Rivers, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. The government also argued that withholding was permitted under exemption 3, which applies to records
that another statute allows the government to withhold.
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district court considered the newly raised defense.136 The district court
concluded that exemption 2 did not cover the inundation maps and rejected
the government’s claims based thereon.137 The court, however, concluded
that the government’s withholding was justified by exemption 7(F) because
of the government’s representations that terrorists might use the maps to
plot an attack. 138 Thus, an exemption that had never been claimed by the
agency prior to litigation, and which was not particularly related to or reasonably foreseeable from the claims that were made in the administrative
decision, ended up defeating the requester’s lawsuit in court.
In another case, a union used FOIA to request payroll reports submitted by a government contractor to the General Services Administration
(“GSA”). 139 The union was seeking to determine if the contractor’s employees were being paid the wage required by federal law. 140 In response to
the request, the GSA denied access to the reports citing exemption 4, which
covers confidential commercial and financial records.141 The union administratively appealed, the GSA again denied on the same basis; and then the
union brought suit in district court. 142 At that point, the GSA asserted that
the reports could also be withheld under exemption 6, which protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 143 Although
the district court concluded that exemption 4, the trade secrets exemption,
only justified the withholding of some of the information contained in the
reports, exemption 6, the personal privacy exemption, which had never
been raised at the administrative level, justified withholding additional portions of information. 144 Thus, it ordered release only of the information not
covered by either exemption. 145
These are not isolated incidences, but rather, the government routinely
raises additional claims of exemption for the first time in litigation.146 For
136. Living Rivers, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1322.
139. Painters Dist. Council #6 v. GSA, No. C85-2971, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056, at *1
(N.D. Ohio July 23, 1986).
140. Id.
141. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012) (exempting “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential”).
142. Painters Dist. Council #6, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056, at *2.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *11, *18.
145. Id. at *18–19.
146. See, e.g., Stonehill v. IRS, 558 F.3d 534, 537, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that the IRS
invoked the deliberative process privilege for the first time in a FOIA district court proceeding,
not having raised it at the administrative level); Sciba v. Bd. of Governor of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
No. Civ.A. 04-1011, 2005 WL 758260, at *1 n.3 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2005) (allowing the government
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the requester, the playing field resembles a game of Whac-A-Mole, 147 in
which new claims of exemption keep popping up even as the initial claims
are defeated. First, the requester discovers the agency’s initial position in
the first denial of the request.148 The requester has a chance, at that point, to
evaluate the strength of the agency’s claim and to decide whether it is worth
his or her while to administratively appeal the denial. 149 If the requester
thinks that he or she has a decent argument that the claimed exemption to
disclosure does not apply, he or she will be much more likely to appeal. 150
While there is no fee to appeal within the administrative agency, it certainly
consumes the requester’s time and energy, and sometimes a requester will
employ the help of a lawyer. 151

to raise four additional exemption claims in court not relied upon in the original denial letter); Kay
v. FCC, 867 F. Supp. 11, 21–22 (D.D.C. 1994) (allowing the FCC to invoke exemption 7(A) despite failing to do so during the administrative process); Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 545 F. Supp. 1229, 1235–36 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding that exemption defenses are not too late if initially raised in the district court).
147. Whac-A-Mole is a popular arcade game invented in the 1970s by Aaron Fechter, comprising an arcade cabinet with five holes, a plastic mole, and a mallet. The purpose of the game is to
bash the moles back into their holes by hitting them on the head with the mallet, as they pop up
randomly.
See Rockafiremovie, The Whac-A-Mole Story, YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Agjaa1DyKyA. The term “whac-a-mole” is used colloquially
as a metaphor to refer to a futile exercise, including within a variety of legal contexts ranging from
copyright violations to regulatory action by federal agencies, courts, and Congress. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 47, Riley v. Kennedy, 533 U.S. 406 (2007) (No. 07-77), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-77.pdf (“[T]he purpose of
section 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] . . . was to prevent a sort of game of Whac-A-Mole in which
the States would keep changing the practice. And the idea of that freeze was to hold it in place so
that it could be challenged as a constitutional matter before the State switched again.”); A. Bryan
Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law Update: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Obesity and Deceptive Labeling Enforcement, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135, 155 (2011)
(“[T]he issue of acai berry weight-loss supplements illustrates the regulatory game of Whac-aMole that often plays out in enforcement actions against online sellers: shut one website down,
and another immediately pops up somewhere else.”); Brad A. Greenberg, More than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1028, 1052 (2012) (“[A]s Douglas Lichtman has said, that default forces copyright holders to play
Whac-A-Mole—searching for and knocking down infringing content like springing moles in the
popular arcade game—while permitting YouTube to get rich selling ads on the same infringing
content.”).
148. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring the government to “notify the person
making such request of such determination and the reasons therefore”).
149. See Kristin Adair & Catherine Nielsen, Effective FOIA Requesting for Everyone: A National Security Archive Guide, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE, 30 (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/foia_guide/foia_guide_full.pdf (discussing the litigation
process of administrative requests).
150. Id.
151. See id. (noting that hiring an attorney may make an impact if the litigant is not familiar
with case law and court procedures); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) (providing for administrative appeals).
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As is the case with respect to other types of agency decisions, once
administratively appealed, the requester could discover that the agency has
a new position concerning why it will not release the records.152 Perhaps it
has abandoned its initial position entirely or just added an additional
claimed basis for withholding. Either way, the requester likely had no way
of anticipating this new claim. Thus, any arguments the requester might
have made to counter the new claim are not going to be considered by the
agency in the first instance. If the new claim is strong, the requester may
have wasted his or her time—as well as the agency’s time—by administratively appealing the decision. If the new claim is weak, the requester is
now at the stage where the next remedy is available only by suing in district
court, and the requester cannot take advantage of the comparatively simple
and efficient administrative appeals process to bring the agency’s error to
its attention. 153
Filing a lawsuit in court, of course, is no minor inconvenience. In addition to a substantial filing fee,154 the assistance of a lawyer is often critical
to any meaningful chance of success.155 Once in litigation, the costs only
escalate because effective FOIA litigation requires not only filing pleadings,
but typically also litigation over Vaughn indices—the specialized affidavits
used by the government to justify withholdings in FOIA cases 156—and
summary judgment motions. 157 Even a pro se litigant must dedicate substantial time to preparing and filing courts papers, far more than making an
initial request or even filing an administrative appeal.158 Unlike other cases
152. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting
that the U.S. Postal Service denied a FOIA request citing two exemptions, and denied the administrative appeal citing a third); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. NIH Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 853 F. Supp. 2d 146, 150 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that, after PETA filed a timely
administrative appeal, the agency issued a final decision in which it explained for the first time the
basis of its withholdings under certain FOIA exemptions).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B). Although a requester has exhausted administrative remedies by
filing an administrative appeal, there is nothing precluding an agency from considering a request
for reconsideration of an appeal denial. See Lakin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 917 F. Supp. 2d 142,
143 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that after the Office of Information Policy closed the appeal, plaintiff
requested that denial of his appeal be reconsidered, which the agency denied before filing suit in
district court).
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2013) (fixing the filing fee for a civil action at $350).
155. See Adair & Nielsen, supra note 149, at 52 (explaining the benefits of a lawyer in FOIA
litigation); see generally Stephen Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439 (2009) (analyzing the major problems facing pro se litigants and
noting low success rates of cases brought by pro se plaintiffs).
156. The Vaughn index is so named after a D.C. Circuit case establishing the procedure,
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
157. See Kwoka, supra note 21, at 227 (stating that summary judgment is the presumptive
method for resolving a FOIA case).
158. See Adair & Nielsen, supra note 149, at 52–53 (detailing the FOIA litigation process and
the considerations in bringing a lawsuit).
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of administrative review where Chenery applies, however, at this time the
game of Whac-A-Mole may continue. It may be only at the point of getting
the government’s affidavits or summary judgment motion that the requester
discovers the agency has yet another claim of exemption or argument for
withholding. 159 Again, perhaps the new claim is more meritorious or at
least more difficult for the requester to defeat, and if the requester had this
information, it might have impacted the requester’s litigation strategy or
even the decision to sue. Moreover, if the new claim is weak and can be defeated, both the agency and requester may have already wasted litigation
resources on earlier claims, only to now face the crux of the issues in the
case. In some cases, the requester’s limited resources may even be exhausted trying to defeat successive agency claims of exemption, leading to an
undeserved agency victory. 160
The agency’s change of position is made worse because, for several
reasons, a requester will rarely be able to anticipate whether there is another
potentially meritorious exemption claim that might arise. First, often the
requester is not in a position to know much about the contents of the records. 161 As the examples above illustrate, the claims of exemption are often
made on very different grounds. In one case, personal privacy claims were
made after the fact when the initial claim was about commercial information. 162 In another, a claim regarding law enforcement concerns was
raised after the initial exemption cited pertained to internally directed agency documents. 163

159. See, e.g., Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. FCC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding without merit plaintiff’s argument that because the FCC raised an exemption claim in its
summary judgment papers, rather than in its initial responsive pleading, that it was waived); Defendant’s Consolidated Reply in Support of Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Hodes v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 532 F.
Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-0161-CKK) (stating that defendant did not cite exemption 3
in its FOIA response letter, nor when upholding denial of plaintiff’s FOIA request, but only in its
motion for summary judgment).
160. Although attorneys’ fees are available to FOIA plaintiffs who substantially prevail at the
discretion of the district court, judicial gloss on this provision has made winning fees an uphill
battle for plaintiffs. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2012) (“The court may assess against the
United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case
under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.”); Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
FBI, 522 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that plaintiff must demonstrate both eligibility for fees and entitlement to them under a four factor test). As such, and given the improbability
of prevailing, attorneys’ fees alone often are not enough of an incentive for the plaintiff and attorney to proceed.
161. The court, however, always has the option of reviewing sensitive documents in camera.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
162. Painters Dist. Council #6 v. GSA, No. C85-2971, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31056, at *2
(N.D. Ohio July 23, 1986).
163. Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1316 (D. Utah
2003).
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Second, even though there are only nine enumerated exemptions to
disclosure under FOIA, 164 FOIA’s exemption 3 covers records “specifically
exempted from disclosure by [another] statute,” so long as that other statute
meets certain criteria.165 What those other statutes are is not only unknown
to the requester, but often, unknowable. The DOJ has compiled a list of
statutes that qualify as exemption 3 statutes, which contains sixty-eight such
statutory provisions, ranging from statutes as specific as one covering certain information obtained by the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program to those as general as certain Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 166 Moreover, as the DOJ explains in its report, the list does not include “any statute which has not yet been considered by a court as a possible Exemption 3 statute,” meaning there are an indeterminate number of
possible statutes that an agency might claim qualify as exemption 3 statutes,
but which have not yet been the subject of litigation.167 Complicating the
situation, some of the statutes that are included on the list have “been found
to qualify under Exemption 3 by one court and found not to qualify by another.” 168 A requester cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all possible exemption 3 claims, or to evaluate whether a statute even qualifies as
an exemption 3 statute where no court has ruled or where even courts cannot agree. 169
Finally, even when a record falls within an exemption to disclosure
under FOIA, the government often retains the power to release the record as
a matter of discretion. 170 Given that fact, an agency’s failure to assert even
an obvious exemption could easily, and justifiably, be interpreted as the

164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
165. Id. § 552(b)(3). In full, exemption 3 states that FOIA does not apply to records that are:
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), if that statute—(A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such
a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph.
Id.
166. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATUTES FOUND TO QUALIFY UNDER EXEMPTION 3 OF FOIA
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption3.pdf.
167. Id. at 1.
168. Id.
169. See id. (listing numerous statutes that qualify as possible exemption 3 claims).
170. See Nate Jones, Document Friday: Cheat Sheet for Discretionary FOIA Releases, NAT’L
SECURITY ARCHIVE (Mar. 18, 2011) http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/03/18/documentfriday-cheat-sheet-for-discretionary-foia-releases/ (displaying a Department of Interior memo
asserting that four of the nine exemptions are eligible for discretionary release); see also Mobil Oil
Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 879 F.2d 698, 700 (9th Cir. 1989) (summarizing the law under FOIA concerning when agencies’ prior disclosure of records waives the right to claim exemption from disclosure).
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agency’s discretionary decision not to invoke it. 171 With little to no way of
predicting what an agency may later bring up as an alternative grounds for
withholding records, requesters are in the very difficult position of having
to evaluate the value of pursuing additional remedies under FOIA without
being able to even guess at the likelihood of success.172
This aspect of FOIA litigation is not only frustrating for the requester,
it also risks wasted agency resources. While at first blush it may seem to
save the agency time in not having to state all alternative bases for withholding in the initial denial, there remain potential unaccounted for costs. 173
For instance, as described above, not asserting all rationales the agency may
ultimately rely on could lead requesters to believe they have a better chance
than they really do on administrative appeal or by filing a lawsuit, and thus
could encourage more appeals and litigation against the agency. 174 In addition, if an agency does not assert a particular exemption or argument until
litigation has commenced, it did not receive the benefit of any counterarguments the requester might have made at the administrative level, which
could have persuaded the agency to come to a different conclusion and prevented the lawsuit in the first place.
D. Conclusion
As FOIA litigation currently stands, the agencies, in effect, have their
cake and eat it too: they enjoy deferential treatment for their positions by
the courts, and they are not constrained in what positions they may take that
will receive this privileged treatment.175 An agency—or more to the point
its lawyers, who usually do not work within the agency—can come up with
any rationale for its past actions withholding records and those rationales
will be treated deferentially by the courts.176 In nearly every other context
171. See David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2008) (arguing that the FOIA process
as currently structured invites further disputes because of agency delay and lack of specificity in
response).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952,
1021 (2007) (describing Chenery as a “constraint [that] polices the conditions for judicial deference to agency action”). One scholar has made the flip side of this argument: that Chenery has
been used, at least in one context, as a way of avoiding the deference actually owed. See Matthew
Ginsburg, “A Nigh Endless Game of Battledore and Shuttlecock”: The D.C. Circuit’s Misuse of
Chenery Remands in NLRB Cases, 86 NEB. L. REV. 595, 609 (2008) (suggesting “that the D.C.
Circuit is using Chenery to avoid extending the deference it owes to the [NLRB]”). In the FOIA
context, Chenery could be used to cabin the deference currently extended but not owed to the
agencies’ positions.
176. See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE
L.J. 1032, 1043 (2011) (stating that under a rule that allows post hoc rationalizations, lawyers
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in which courts defer to agency actions, Chenery constrains the court’s ability to defer by dictating the position the court must consider: only that
which was articulated at the time the decision was made. 177 The deference
in FOIA litigation, unconstrained by Chenery, distorts the proceedings such
that agencies are at an even greater advantage under the purportedly de novo review of FOIA litigation than when other types of actions are challenged and reviewed deferentially. 178 Under this regime, FOIA decisions
are affirmed at a shockingly high rate, a pattern that flips FOIA’s maximum
transparency goal on its head. 179
II. RELOCATING FOIA IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Documenting the judicial deference that produces a striking ninety
percent affirmance rate in FOIA cases 180 undermines any claim that courts
engage in true de novo review of FOIA cases. As I have argued elsewhere,
strategies exist by which Congress, courts, and litigants all could work toward correcting the standard of review in FOIA cases and restoring true de
novo judicial review of agency decisions to withhold records from the public. 181 Realistically, however, it is imperative to acknowledge that these
strategies may have limited success. Congress tried course-correction in
this area once before without managing to truly reverse the deference trends
in the courts; 182 courts and litigants, for their part, are accustomed to FOIA
litigation as it typically proceeds and revisiting old precedents is not a priority. 183
Perhaps even more of a barrier to restoring true de novo review is an
intangible sentiment that Congress has asked the courts to perform a function the courts feel neither qualified nor comfortable performing: secondguessing agencies’ factual representations in areas traditionally in the purview of the executive branch, such as national security. 184 Moreover, overburdened courts have little patience for the type of page-by-page, or even

formulate reasons that are presented to the court and that can be completely different from what
was proffered by the agency).
177. Id. at 1042.
178. Id.
179. See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 713 (reporting a ninety percent affirmance rate in FOIA
cases).
180. Id.
181. Kwoka, supra note 21, at 239–42.
182. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)); see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
183. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
184. See Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 753,
760–61 (1988) (“Probing even a little into national security matters [in a FOIA case] is not an easy
or a pleasant job.”).

KwokaFinalBookProof

2014]

5/14/2014 10:51 AM

Deference, Chenery, and FOIA

1087

line-by-line, review of records in camera that FOIA permits (but does not
require) them to perform. 185 It has been suggested that courts view FOIA
generally as having questionable value.186
If courts are unable or unwilling to enforce FOIA rights the way Congress envisioned, it poses a separation of powers problem in which the
courts are failing to respect a co-equal branch’s legitimate exercise of its
constitutional powers to legislate.187 It is not, however, a problem that is
easily solved by simply pointing out that judges should perform a function
they feel ill-equipped to perform or about which they may be acting on unconscious beliefs about the merits of FOIA as a transparency tool. 188 Indeed, while FOIA jurisprudence has gone awry, much of its deviation from
the norm arose from judges trying to improve FOIA litigation as a check on
agencies, not to diminish it. 189 While a true de novo regime might be optimal, in many ways, FOIA’s almost fifty-year experiment with de novo review has simply failed.
As a result, other solutions should be explored, particularly with the
goal of cabining the overwhelming deference in FOIA cases. 190 Chenery

185. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (authorizing in camera review); see also Fuchs, supra note 67, at
173 (showing that in camera inspection has “fallen into disfavor in recent years”).
186. See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 715–16 (citing courts’ “skepticism,” if not “resistance,”
toward FOIA).
187. Kwoka, supra note 21, at 235.
188. As David Dyzenhaus has argued, in cases where the judiciary may feel ill-equipped to
rule, “rather than find what the executive does is beyond the reach of law, judges will find that,
given the situation, they should, as a matter of law, defer to the executive’s judgment about what
is required.” DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY 19 (2006). Dyzenhaus describes the resulting review as a legal “grey hole,” defined
as “a legal space in which there are some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a lawless
void—but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it
pleases.” Id. at 42. Dyzenhaus claims that “grey holes cause more harm to the rule of law than
black holes [which represents an absence of judicial review, because] . . . the procedural rights
available to the detainee cloak the lack of substance.” Id. at 50. This describes the current state of
play in review of FOIA decisions, in which procedural rights mask the lack of meaningful review,
and the rule of law would be better served by honestly describing the standard of review judges
can actually employ.
189. The Vaughn index is a prime example of a tool judges believed would help the requester,
but which has turned out to tilt the playing field even farther in favor of the agency. See supra
note 82 and accompanying text.
190. My approach is consistent with an economic theory of “second best optimum”:
[I]f there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents
the attainment of one of the Paretian [optimal] conditions, the other Paretian [optimal]
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable. In other words,
given that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum
situation can be achieved only by departing from all the other Paretian [optimal] conditions. The optimum situation finally attained may be termed a second best optimum
because it is achieved subject to a constraint which, by definition, prevents the attainment of a Paretian optimum.
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offers a solution in this regard.191 Reconceptualizing FOIA litigation as not
an exception to basic administrative law principles, but rather subject to
both the deference to and constraints on agencies in typical administrative
litigation, would acknowledge the reality of deference in FOIA litigation
and cabin its effects. 192 Chenery’s use in FOIA litigation, however, must be
doctrinally and theoretically justified. When the reality of FOIA litigation—rather than the formal standards—is considered, the theories underlying Chenery, its practical operation, and the statutory scheme under FOIA
all support its application.
A. The Chenery Principle
The origins of the Chenery principle are not entirely clear: while some
ascribe constitutional dimensions to Chenery, others see it as part and parcel with statutory mandates, and still others understand Chenery as allocat-

R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11,
11 (1956). Other scholars have applied this theory in the judicial context. See, e.g., Justin Pidot,
Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29 & n.120 (2012) (demonstrating that, in
the absence of true checks and balances, courts use a second-best approach to check their own
power in ascertaining their jurisdiction to hear a case). As to FOIA litigation, the optimum might
be true de novo review, without the application of the Chenery principle. Given that the optimal
condition of de novo review is constrained by courts’ ability to realistically second-guess certain
agency representations and deference is thus used in practice, the “second best optimum” is not
achieved by retaining the other condition of the optimum: inapplicability of Chenery. This Article
contends that the second best optimum is achieved by departing from the condition of Chenery’s
inapplicability as well and instead looking at FOIA litigation under the paradigm of typical administrative law litigation.
191. It is, by no means, the only solution to the problems posed in FOIA litigation. See, e.g.,
Danae J. Aitchison, Comment, Reining in the Glomar Response: Reducing CIA Abuse of the
Freedom of Information Act, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 219, 249–51 (1993) (suggesting that Congress should provide the courts with more explicit power to evaluate so-called Glomar responses
in FOIA cases, in which the government refuses to admit or deny the existence of responsive records); Nathan Slegers, Comment, De Novo Review Under the Freedom of Information Act: The
Case Against Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 209, 235 (2006) (proposing that FOIA decisions could be moved closer to de novo review
either by mandatory in camera review or through the use of plaintiffs’ experts or court appointed
independent experts).
192. The idea of the “second best” in the administrative law context has also been theorized.
See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a
Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). McCutchen contends
that the administrative state is inherently inconsistent with the separation of powers principles in
the Constitution, and argues that the Supreme Court should tolerate unconstitutional structures that
are institutionalized but should also allow the creation of compensating institutions that move the
balance of powers closer toward the constitutional optimum. Id. at 2–3, 11, 22. In short, the theories of second best solutions accept the initial “wrong,” in this case deference to agencies in FOIA
litigation, and look for a compensating or countervailing change in the state of play that will move
the state of play closer to the ideal, even if the compensation itself is of questionable permissibility.
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ing power among agency actors. 193 In every account of Chenery, however,
there is an inherent and uncontroverted link between the application of the
Chenery principle and the deference courts owe to an agency’s position.194
Not only are deference and Chenery linked, but, as this section will demonstrate, Chenery operates as a necessary and justified constraint on the deference the judiciary gives to the administrative state.195
1. Origins
The Chenery principle was announced in 1943 in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery” or “Chenery I”). 196 The
dispute in Chenery arose under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(“PUHCA”), which required reorganization of public utility companies to
be approved by the SEC. 197 The SEC denied approval of a particular plan
because it permitted officers and directors of the company to execute trades
on the company’s securities during reorganization.198 The SEC reasoned
that such trades would violate the fiduciary duties of the officers and directors. 199 Reviewing this order, the Supreme Court concluded that the SEC
wrongly found a fiduciary violation in the stock purchases since the purchases were not based on insider trading, preferential treatment, or secret
dealings. 200
The Court refused, however, to consider the SEC’s alternative rationale, advanced for the first time in litigation, that even if there were no
breach of fiduciary duty, the SEC had the discretionary power under the
PUHCA to find a reorganization plan that permitted fiduciaries to trade in
the company’s stock either contrary to the public interest or not fair and equitable as required under PUHCA. 201 The Court explained that “[t]he
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon
which the record discloses that its action was based.” 202 Since the rationale

193. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 419 (1971) (relying
in part on language from APA to justify the Chenery principle), abrogated on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1043 (arguing
that Chenery’s effect is to reallocate power horizontally within agencies); Stack, supra note 175,
at 982 (arguing that Chenery is an arm of the nondelegation doctrine).
194. See infra Part III.A.2.
195. See infra Part II.A.1.
196. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
197. Id. at 82.
198. Id. at 85.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 85–86, 93.
201. Id. at 90.
202. Id. at 87.
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on which the SEC had relied was based on legal error, the Supreme Court
reversed. 203
Because Chenery concerned an agency adjudication with the hallmarks
of formality and predated the APA, the principle announced might have
been applied in limited circumstances or abandoned entirely. Indeed, the
APA’s clearly delineated distinction between formal and informal proceedings, 204 and between adjudications and rulemakings, 205 seemed ready-made
for, at a minimum, a judicial review doctrine constrained to formal adjudications. Instead, the Chenery principle has grown in scope and is now held
to apply to agency actions in almost every context.206 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 207 the Supreme Court extended the Chenery
principle to informal adjudications such as the Secretary of Transportation’s
decision to permit construction of a federally-funded highway through a
park because there lacked a feasible alternative. 208 In Overton Park, the
Court cited Chenery for the principle that affidavits created during the litigation were “post hoc rationalizations” not entitled to consideration.209 The
Court explained that relying on such affidavits would also violate the judicial review provision of the APA, which requires the court to review “the
whole record.” 210 The Court concluded that the affidavits were not part of
the “whole record,” which the APA required to be the basis for review. 211
In effect, the Court, without much explanation, located the Chenery principle in the APA and extended it to constrain judicial review of both formal
and informal adjudications. 212
The Court has also extended the Chenery principle to the review of
rulemakings. Informal rulemaking is the default procedure for the creation
of binding, legislative rules, and is known more commonly as notice-and203. Id. at 95.
204. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (enumerating the now-familiar notice and comment procedures for what are known as informal rulemakings, but requiring the more formal procedures in
Sections 556 and 557 in those rulemakings specified to be made after a hearing on the record); id.
§ 554 (applying this section, and by reference, the formal procedures provided for in Sections 556
and 557, to those adjudications required to be decided after a hearing on the record, thereby distinguishing between formal and informal adjudications).
205. Id. § 551(4) (providing a definition of a “rule”); id. § 551(6), (7) (defining an “order” as
the result of an adjudication, and encompassing everything other than a “rule”).
206. Stack, supra note 175, at 956.
207. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99
(1977).
208. Id. at 417.
209. Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”).
211. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id.
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comment rulemaking. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 213 the Supreme
Court considered the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s notice-and-comment rule repealing a requirement that all new cars have a passive restraint system consisting either of automatic seat belts or of air
bags. 214 The Court described the appropriate review of notice-andcomment rules as what has now been dubbed “hard look” 215 review, a series
of inquiries the Court found rooted in the formal arbitrary and capricious
standard. 216 Under hard look review, a court must assure itself that an
agency’s position has not,
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 217
Importantly, the Court, immediately after articulating this list, announced
that the Chenery principle applies: “The reviewing court should not attempt
itself to make up for such deficiencies [by] . . . supply[ing] a reasoned basis
for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.” 218
The State Farm decision even had the occasion to apply Chenery in
the rulemaking context.219 One ground on which the Court found the agency’s analysis lacking was that, while it documented the problems associated
with automatic seatbelts, it failed to consider the obvious alternative to repealing the rule entirely, which was to require airbags in all vehicles. 220
Because the agency had not considered that option, there were no reasons
and no rationale in the record for rejecting it, and the Court accordingly refused to consider the agency’s explanation proffered during litigation. 221
2. Link to Deference
Thus established, the Chenery principle requires courts in a wide variety of cases reviewing agency actions to limit their inquiry to the permis-

213. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
214. Id. at 38.
215. See Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909,
1912–19 (2009) (describing the modern hard look doctrine as “best encapsulated” in State Farm).
216. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43.
217. Id. at 43.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 49.
221. Id. at 50.
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sibility of the agency’s contemporaneous rationale for the decision. But,
from where did this principle come? After all, appellate courts are generally free to affirm district court orders on any grounds apparent in the record,
even if not relied upon or even ruled on by the district court. 222 When
courts review acts of Congress, Congress is not required to explain itself
and legislation typically must be upheld unless there is no permissible basis
for it. 223 In this sense, then, administrative law is unique: only in the agency context do courts require the governmental action under review to stand
or fall based on the reasoning provided at the time the decision was
made. 224
The Chenery Court suggested that this administrative exceptionalism
arises from the constitutional separation of powers principles.225 In
Chenery, the Court explained that it was not up to the judiciary to decide
what is contrary to the public interest or what is fair and equitable under the
PUHCA. 226 Rather, the Court said, the agency must actually exercise its
power, granted by Congress, to make such a determination. 227 To supplant
reasons or rely on rationales not provided by the agency itself when it made
the decision would, in effect, be overreaching on the part of the judiciary. 228
In fact, judicially provided rationales may not be rationales the agency
would have actually adopted, thereby thwarting the outcome the agency
would have reached. For this reason, “[i]ts action must be measured by
what the [agency] did, not by what it might have done.” 229
After the Chenery Court reversed the agency’s denial of approval of
the reorganization plan, it remanded the case back to the agency for further
consideration. 230 The agency, in turn, reconsidered the original matter and
again rejected the proposed reorganization plan, but this time on a different
rationale. 231 The new decision was again challenged, and the case again
222. See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”); Stack, supra note 175, at 955 (noting
this general rule). But see Richard Murphy, Chenery Unmasked: Reasonable Limits on the Duty
to Give Reasons, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 826 (2012) (documenting instances where lower courts’
failure to provide adequate reasoning to support discretionary decisions results in reversal).
223. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–96 (2012) (upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on the rationale that it was an exercise of
Congress’s power to tax, even though Congress justified the legislation on the Commerce Clause);
see also Stack, supra note 175, at 955 (contrasting this principle to administrative law rules).
224. Stack, supra note 175, at 955–56.
225. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 93–94.
230. Id. at 95.
231. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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reached the Supreme Court (Chenery II). 232 This time the Supreme Court
began by rearticulating the Chenery principle, calling it a “fundamental rule
of administrative law,” and warning that a court is “powerless” to affirm an
agency action on a basis other than that which was stated by the agency at
the time. 233 Further, the Court noted that “[t]o do so would propel the court
into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.” 234 The agency’s new rationale, the Court concluded, was
adequate to sustain the agency’s decision and the Court therefore affirmed
the denial of plan approval.235
The explanations of the Chenery principle in Chenery I and Chenery II
point to a separation of powers rationale, limiting the power of the judiciary
when Congress has delegated the relevant authority exclusively to the executive branch. 236 This rationale has been rearticulated at various times by
courts and scholars alike. 237 The Supreme Court’s somewhat cursory explanation of the rationale behind the Chenery principle is, however, hardly a
full accounting of the rule’s relationship to other administrative law doctrines or to the constitutional foundations of agency authority. Indeed, Kevin Stack notes that despite the fact that Chenery remains one of the most
common grounds for reversal of agency actions, there is a “curious uncertainty concerning its basis.” 238 The separation of powers rationale itself is
also somewhat unsatisfying, if not at times downright counterintuitive; it is,
after all, a bit ironic to claim courts are more respectful of an agency’s special role mandated by Congress when they overturn the agency’s action
than when they uphold it. 239
As discussed below, other justifications for Chenery have been theorized, including one based on the nondelegation doctrine and another based
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 209.
236. Id. at 207; SEC v. Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
237. See, e.g., Global Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290, 1298–99 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting that “Chenery I was based upon the proposition that a ‘determination of policy or judgment’ that Congress had entrusted to an agency could not be exercised in the first instance by a
court”); Time, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 667 F.2d 329, 334–35 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that Chenery
II explained the purpose of the Chenery principle as avoiding “propel[ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency”); Ronald M. Levin,
“Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE
L.J. 291, 367–68 (2003) (noting that “[a]lthough one usually thinks of the doctrine as a limitation
on the circumstances in which an agency action can be upheld, one of its corollaries is that, as a
general rule, a court also may not reject an agency action by making its own determinations on an
issue that lies within the agency’s discretionary authority”).
238. Stack, supra note 175, at 957.
239. See Murphy, supra note 222, at 846 (labeling as counterintuitive the Chenery Court’s
claim that upholding the Commission order would infringe on the Commission’s authority).
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on allocating power within the agency. 240 In the end, these justifications are
highly related to one another, and, most importantly for the purposes of
Chenery’s relationship to FOIA, each justification links Chenery’s application to judicial deference to agencies. To be sure, these justifications link
Chenery specifically to Chevron deference, a type of deference not invoked
in FOIA cases. As described below, however, the rationale linking Chenery
to Chevron deference can be applied by analogy to link Chenery to the observed deference in FOIA cases as a practical reality, even if not as a formal
undertaking.
The relationship between deference and the Chenery doctrine is
longstanding, and can be found even in the separation of powers rationale
articulated by the Supreme Court in the Chenery cases themselves. 241 In
Chenery II, the Court explained that the Chenery principle applies when a
court is “dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative
agency alone is authorized to make.” 242 This is an important limitation on
Chenery’s reach and is, of course, also essentially the same condition necessary for courts to defer to an agency’s legal interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision under Chevron.243 Thus, where Chenery does not
apply, Chevron likewise does not come into play. 244 For example, neither
the Chenery principle nor Chevron deference is invoked when courts review
agency interpretations of the APA, 245 the National Environmental Policy
Act, 246 the Privacy Act, 247 or, relevant here, FOIA. 248 The reason for these
types of exemptions is that these are statutes Congress has not delegated to
any particular agency to administer. 249

240. See infra notes 250–269 and accompanying text.
241. Chenery II, 332 U.S., at 207 (deferring to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
conclusion disapproving of a federal water company’s reorganization since the Commission made
“an informed, expert judgment on the problem”).
242. Id. at 196.
243. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (explaining that when a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the
court must defer to the agency’s answer to that issue when it is based upon a permissible construction of the statute).
244. Although there is a large overlap in the conditions for applying Chenery and Chevron, the
overlap is not complete. For a detailed account of some differences at the margins and cases in
which only one or the other doctrine applies, see Stack, supra note 175, at 1010–13.
245. See Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, 1059–60 (5th Cir. 1985) (declining to apply the Chenery principle to the agency’s interpretation of the APA requirements).
246. See Olmstead Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. United States, 793 F.2d 201, 208 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1986) (declining to apply the Chenery principle to the agency’s interpretation of NEPA).
247. See Louis v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 419 F.3d 970, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply the Chenery principle to the agency’s interpretation of the Privacy Act).
248. See supra Part II.B (discussing courts’ rationales for not applying the Chenery principle
to withholding decisions under FOIA).
249. Stack, supra note 175, at 965–66.

KwokaFinalBookProof

2014]

5/14/2014 10:51 AM

Deference, Chenery, and FOIA

1095

Stack provided a compelling constitutional account of this connection
between Chenery and Chevron in his argument that Chenery is rooted in the
nondelegation doctrine. 250 According to the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate away its legislative power, which is vested to it by
the Constitution. 251 Modern nondelegation cases articulate the requirement
that when Congress delegates power to the agencies, it must provide an “intelligible principle” to guide the agencies and by which courts may measure
agencies’ actions on review. 252 So long as Congress supplies such an intelligible principle, the delegation does not give away Congress’s essential
legislative power because Congress, not the agency, has made the critical
policy choice.253
Stack’s review of Chenery’s roots, however, was premised on a more
nuanced understanding of the nondelegation doctrine. According to his account, Chenery is based in early nondelegation cases that articulated the
nondelegation doctrine not as a single requirement, but in two parts: first,
that Congress set the standard to guide agency action (the origins of the intelligible principle requirement); and second, that an agency expressly state
the basis for its action (the origins, according to Stack, of the Chenery principle). 254 This two-part articulation reflected a “‘contingency’ theory” of
nondelegation, which, Stack explained, allowed delegations to the executive
branch only when the power to take a particular action was conditioned on
the occurrence of some “named contingency,” and the executive branch expressly found that such contingency was met. 255 Stack illustrated the contingency theory of nondelegation with an early case in which the executive
branch deported an individual without making a finding that the person was
an “undesirable” resident, even though the statute allowed the executive
branch to deport only “undesirable residents of the United States.”256 Absent a finding of the condition—the undesirability of the resident—the executive branch had acted outside its delegated authority and thus unconsti-

250. Id. at 1007 (arguing that “[t]he nondelegation account of Chenery helps to explain why
the demand for reasoned decision-making is part and parcel of the reasonableness inquiry at Chevron Step Two”). The nondelegation doctrine stems from the vesting clause in Article I, which
vests all “legislative [p]owers” in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (explaining the constitutional dimensions of the nondelegation doctrine).
251. Stack, supra note 175, at 982.
252. Id. at 958 (quoting J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
253. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that Congress may wish to legislate in an area it had not previously sought to enter because “[i]t is the hard choices, and not the filling in of the blanks, which
must be made by the elected representatives of the people”).
254. Stack, supra note 175, at 982.
255. Id. at 983 (internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. at 985 (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924)).
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tutionally. 257 Subsequent early cases reaffirmed that an executive finding
concerning a necessary condition for taking action was constitutionally required. 258
Stack’s account not only links the Chenery principle to nondelegation,
but also to judicial deference to agency actions, most importantly Chevron
deference. 259 Under Chevron, a court must defer to an agency interpretation
of a statute the agency is charged with administering when the agency is interpreting an ambiguous provision and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. 260 The first part of the inquiry, whether the statutory provision is
ambiguous or clear, is known as Chevron “Step One,” while determining
the reasonableness of the agency interpretation is known as “Step Two.” 261
According to courts, Chevron deference is warranted when Congress leaves
the meaning of a statute ambiguous because it intends to delegate to the
agency the task of filling in the details by regulation by bringing to bear its
expertise in the area. 262
Stack demonstrated that when courts reach Step Two, it is the reasonableness of the agency’s contemporaneous rationale that is to be tested, not a
post-hoc rationale offered in litigation.263 That is, Chenery constrains
courts’ exercise of Chevron deference by limiting the agency’s position to
which deference is owed to that which it took at the time the decision was
made. 264 As Stack argued, the nondelegation account of Chenery, which
preconditions the permissible exercise of agency action upon the agency
contemporaneously providing a reason for its action, shows the common
origins of both doctrines: ensuring Congress’s delegation to the agency was

257. See id. at 984–85 (citing to Mahler to explain how the Court enforces the contingency
theory of delegation by finding that specified contingency conditions are present).
258. Id. at 988; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating the
President’s ban of “hot oil” in part due to a lack of finding even where the statute did not contain
an express finding requirement).
259. Stack, supra note 175, at 1005.
260. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
261. See Vill. of Barrington, Ill. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 659–60 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (explaining that if Congress has not unambiguously foreclosed the agency’s statutory interpretation and there is some ambiguity that has left the agency within a range of possibilities, the
agency will have survived Chevron Step One, leaving the court for Chevron Step Two to defer to
the agency’s interpretation if it offered a reasonable explanation for it).
262. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (deferring when “Congress . . . explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill”); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (explaining
that Chevron deference applies when it is “apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted
law”).
263. Stack, supra note 175, at 1006 (citing as an example Kansas City v. Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
264. Id. at 1007.
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actually exercised by the agency. 265 Stack succinctly described the relationship between the two doctrines: “Chenery is the coin with which the agency
pays for Chevron deference.” 266 That is, without Chenery, agencies would
be free not to articulate a rationale for their actions and courts would balk at
deferring to rationales with which the agency may not even agree, as they
may have been dreamed up only for the purpose of litigation.267
Another account of Chenery, while diverging from Stack’s in its theoretical underpinnings, also closely links Chenery to Chevron deference.
Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule reframe major administrative law
doctrines, including Chenery and Chevron, not as primarily allocating power between the branches of government like a nondelegation account does,
but rather as allocating power between different actors within the agencies
themselves. 268 They identify Chenery and Chevron as two judicial review
doctrines that have a common effect of empowering policy professionals
and agency experts over lawyers. 269
For Chenery, requiring the reasons given at the time the decision was
made to be the sole grounds on which an agency action can be upheld
means that various types of professionals, including technical and policy
experts, are involved in the ex ante decisionmaking. 270 On this theory, lawyers may be involved, too, but they will not be the only or dominant
force. 271 Without Chenery, an agency’s actions can be defended on any
ground once challenged in court, which would empower the lawyers representing the agency to claim a central role, formulating the justifications that
will be argued in court and representations that will be made on behalf of
the agency. 272 For exactly this reason, Judge Patricia Wald once offered
advice to agencies “that it is more important to ‘moot’ the drafters of their

265. See id. at 992 (arguing that the Chenery principle’s implementation of the express statement requirement promotes political accountability, nonarbitrariness, and regularity).
266. Id. at 959.
267. Id. at 958–59.
268. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1035 (arguing that within agencies, administrative law allocates power among professionals like lawyers, scientists, civil servants, and politicians, as well as agency heads, bureaucrats, and line personnel).
269. See id. at 1043–44, 1046, 1048 (noting that Chenery ensures that non-lawyers always
have an ex ante role in developing agency positions, and that under Chevron, a lawyer’s role is
constrained to identifying the range of reasonable statutory interpretations while policymaking
officials choose within the range). The courts also acknowledge Chenery as acting as a constraint
on lawyers. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971)
(holding litigation documents an inadequate basis of review under Chenery), abrogated on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
270. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1043–44.
271. Id. at 1044.
272. Id. at 1043.

KwokaFinalBookProof

1098

5/14/2014 10:51 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:1060

regulations prior to issuance than the lawyers who go to court to defend
those regulations.” 273
In conjunction with Chenery, Chevron has much the same effect. As
Magill and Vermeule describe, Chevron is premised on the notion that there
may not be a single correct statutory interpretation of an ambiguous provision. 274 Rather, the premise is that agencies will exercise their policy expertise to elect one among multiple permissible options. 275 The concept has
been recently described as “Chevron space,” boundaries within which the
agency is free to make policy decisions with the force of law and without
judicial interference.276 If Chevron does not apply, a court will eventually
decide precisely what a statute means and, as a result, the lawyers within
the agency will take a central role in advising the agency on the proper
meaning of the statute.277 When, however, an agency’s interpretation of a
statute will be given Chevron deference, policymakers and experts will be
empowered to choose the agency’s path within the range of possibilities
contemplated under the statute. 278 Moreover, under this view, Magill and
Vermeule also posit that Chenery and Chevron are linked insofar as
Chenery defines exactly what views are entitled to Chevron deference. 279
B. Deference Under FOIA Justifies Chenery
Under the leading theoretical frameworks used to understand the
Chenery principle, Chenery is thus inextricably tied to the doctrine of Chevron deference. Of course, Chevron deference is never implicated in FOIA
cases because FOIA is not administered by any particular agency, but ap-

273. Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 639 (1994).
274. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1046 (discussing “agency interpretation as a
choice . . . [between a] range of reasonable interpretations”).
275. Id.
276. See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (“The whole idea of ‘agency’ is
that the agent has a certain authority, a zone of responsibility legislatively conferred upon it.”).
277. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1046–47.
278. Id. at 1046.
279. Id. at 1048–49. Magill and Vermeule use Justice Scalia’s minority view, which would
grant Chevron deference in a much wider range of scenarios than the current doctrine permits, in
order to illuminate how permitting Chevron deference to anything less than official pronouncements contemporaneous with the decision eviscerates, in those instances, Chenery. Id.; see also
Stack, supra note 175, at 1005 (stating that “[t]he clearest point of connection between Chevron
and Chenery is that compliance with the Chenery principle operates as a condition for the agency
to receive deference in Chevron”). For an argument that Scalia’s view is no longer the minority,
see Peter Strauss, In Search of Skidmore 8–9 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working
Paper
Grp.,
Paper
No.
13-355,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287343.
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plies equally across the executive branch.280 Moreover, FOIA denial letters
do not have precedential value or the “force of law” as is required to invoke
Chevron deference. 281 Thus, to extend Chenery to the FOIA context would
necessarily invoke Chenery where Chevron does not apply.
Extending Chenery beyond circumstances where Chevron deference
applies, however, has ample precedential support. Chevron is a deference
doctrine that applies only to agencies’ legal interpretations.282 Other deference doctrines are, instead, rooted in the APA itself and apply to factual determination and discretionary decisions.283 Judge Henry Friendly, in a
foundational treatment of Chenery, argued that Chenery should apply to
limit the inquiry concerning the rationales or reasons for a particular conclusion, but should not apply to mandate reversal every time the agency
made an erroneous subsidiary fact finding. 284 Rather, erroneous fact finding, according to Judge Friendly, should be dealt with only substantively
under the substantial evidence or other appropriate standard of review. 285
Judge Friendly also urged courts to distinguish between inadequate reasons
and the Chenery doctrine itself, which concerns impermissible reasons. 286
These distinctions, however, have not taken root in judicial decisions. 287 While perhaps undertheorized, courts have applied Chenery equally when deferential review of fact-finding or discretionary decisionmaking
is invoked. 288 For instance, in Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 289
the Supreme Court invoked Chenery in refusing to consider factual assertions advanced by an agency in an attempt to justify a discretionary choice
of remedy. 290 In that case, Chevron deference was never in play; rather, the

280. See AT&T, Inc., v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131
S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (declining to give Chevron deference to FCC in FOIA case).
281. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (refusing to apply Chevron
deference to tariff decisions with no precedential value and without “the force of law”).
282. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833–34
(2001).
283. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
284. Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, DUKE L.J. 199, 205, 207 (1969).
285. Id. at 205–06.
286. Id. at 206.
287. See Stack, supra note 175, at 964 (noting that courts have not “cabined Chenery’s application to the particular deficiency at issue in Chenery—agency reliance on a legal error”).
288. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167–69 (1962) (applying Chenery in a case reviewed under the APA’s “substantial evidence” and abuse of discretion
standards).
289. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
290. Id. at 168; see also ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987) (explaining that Chenery precludes a court from affirming “on a basis containing any element of discretion—including discretion to find facts and interpret statutory ambiguities—that is not the basis
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APA substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards governed review. 291 In fact, Chenery has been invoked in some of the very same cases
that have defined key APA standards of review that have nothing to do with
Chevron, such as State Farm, which described the “hard look” version of
arbitrary or capricious review. 292 Moreover, courts have explicitly linked
the APA’s requirements to provide reasons justifying certain types of decisions to the Chenery doctrine, rather than disaggregating them, as Judge
Friendly proposed. 293 As a result, the Chenery principle is applied in reviewing nearly all types of administrative decisions reviewed under deferential standards, and has not been constrained to situations involving Chevron deference or formal delegations of lawmaking authority by Congress. 294
When the purpose and operation of types of deference other than
Chevron are examined, the theoretical underpinnings of Chenery and its
linkage to Chevron justify Chenery’s application to decisions entitled to
statutory deference by analogy. As described above, the theoretical link between the Chenery principle and Chevron deference is that they act in concert to ensure that agency expertise is actually brought to bear in areas within the agency’s congressionally assigned purview.295 Relatedly, they ensure
that the courts are not deferring to (and thus empowering) the wrong set of
actors: lawyers representing the agency in litigation. 296
Those same principles animate other types of deference. While Chevron deference arises from Congress’s delegation of lawmaking authority to
an agency, APA deference standards are themselves also prescribed by
Congress. 297 Standards of review have long operated as a way of assigning
the agency used, since that would remove the discretionary judgment from the agency to the
court”).
291. Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 167.
292. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 49–50 (1983)
(refusing to consider post-hoc factual assertions under Chenery in reviewing a discretionary decision under APA standards in a case having nothing to do with Chevron deference); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417 (1971) (same), abrogated on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
293. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 402, 417, 419–20 (linking Chenery to the APA’s requirement that the court review the whole record); Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843, 846–47
(8th Cir. 2009) (linking Chenery to deference afforded under the APA).
294. But see Stack, supra note 175, at 1012 (arguing that Chenery should not apply if an agency lacks the authority to issue binding interpretations of law and thus its interpretations of a statute
are reviewed using Skidmore deference, rather than Chevron deference).
295. See supra Part III.A.2. Under the nondelegation constitutional account, Chenery and
Chevron deference have common origins: ensuring that the agency is acting within its power as
delegated by Congress. Stack, supra note 175, at 982.
296. See supra Part III.A.2. On the policy-based account, Chenery has the effect of empowering agency professionals and experts, and disempowering, relatively speaking, the agency’s lawyers. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1046.
297. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (statutorily enumerating APA standards of review, including
deferential standards such as arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion and substantial evidence).
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primary responsibility between reviewing courts and initial decisionmakers. 298 When Congress prescribes a deferential standard of review, the initial decisionmaker is assigned greater responsibility, even if that responsibility is not lawmaking authority delegated from Congress.299 Moreover,
these assignments of responsibility are typically based on a view of the correct decisionmaker in light of relative expertise.300 In any situation in
which the courts owe agencies deference, the Chenery principle, in turn,
operates to ensure that agency professionals actually exercise the responsibility they are assigned.301
The observed deference in FOIA cases, which empirical evidence suggests is even stronger than other types of deference to agencies, justifies the
application of Chenery for these same reasons. First, while deference under
FOIA is a murkier proposition, as Congress formally chose a de novo
standard of review, Congress still made a key assignment of responsibility
to agencies in the FOIA context in the form of a reasons-giving requirement, suggesting that Congress wanted the agency, not its DOJ lawyers, to
provide reasons. 302 Second, in deferring to agencies in FOIA litigation,
courts treat agencies as exercising expertise and discretion, and employing
Chenery to ensure that expertise and discretion are actually exercised is
therefore justified by the functional deference given. 303 Thus, like in other
contexts in which Chenery has extended beyond cases invoking Chevron
deference, the Chenery principle should apply to FOIA review.
1. Congressional Assignment
Courts have often relied on the Chenery decision in conjunction with
governing statutes to conclude that post-hoc rationalizations will not be
considered. For instance, the Chenery decision and resulting Chenery prin-

298. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 47–48 (2000).
299. It is worth at least considering that there is some amount of consensus that Congress’s
intent to allocate authority to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions is a fiction, whereas the
deferential standards in the APA were carefully considered by Congress and positively enacted.
See Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771,
792 (2002) (noting the fiction of delegation); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559
(1996) (detailing the tortured legislative history of the APA, including the standard of review provisions).
300. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1043–44 (arguing that Chenery’s effect is to
reallocate power horizontally within agencies).
301. Id.
302. See infra Part II.B.1.
303. See infra Part II.B.2.
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ciple predate the enactment of the APA. 304 Nonetheless, courts have at
times relied on APA provisions to invoke Chenery, or at least to explain
Chenery’s integral role in administrative law. For example, in extending
the Chenery principle to informal decisionmaking in Overton Park, the Supreme Court relied on Chenery and the APA in the same breath. 305 Specifically, the Court referenced the APA’s requirement that the court review
“the ‘whole record’” when an agency action is challenged. 306 In other cases, the Court has relied on other statutory requirements as an alternative rationale for applying Chenery. 307 In State Farm, the Supreme Court refused
to consider post-hoc rationales in reviewing a notice-and-comment rulemaking, citing both Chenery and the governing motor vehicle statute. 308
The Court found it relevant that the motor vehicle statute specifically required a record of the rulemaking to be compiled and submitted to the reviewing court and that the reviewing court uphold any outcome supported
by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 309
An analogous rationale provides strong support for applying the
Chenery principle in the FOIA context, as the text of FOIA itself suggests
Chenery’s application. FOIA details the specific procedures agencies must
follow in responding to a FOIA request. 310 Agencies are under a strict
twenty business day deadline to respond to a request for records made under FOIA, by which the agency must “notify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of
such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination.” 311
This requirement that agencies state their reasons for a FOIA denial is
even more explicit than the statutory bases relied on by the Supreme Court
to extend Chenery beyond formal proceedings in Overton Park and State
Farm. 312 In fact, in the FOIA context, there need not be any mystery about
where a reasons-giving requirement originates: it is explicitly laid out in the
text of the statute itself. 313 The APA has no such explicit reasons-giving
304. The APA was enacted on June 11, 1946, after Chenery was decided on February 1, 1943.
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946); SEC v. Chenery
(Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
305. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417, 419 (1971), abrogated
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
306. Id. at 419; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
307. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)
(using the governing motor vehicle statute as a rationale for applying Chenery).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 43–44.
310. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
311. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 304–310.
313. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A).
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requirement as to other informal adjudications. 314 As Stack has compellingly argued in other contexts, a reasons-giving requirement goes hand-in-hand
with refusing to consider post-hoc rationalizations proffered by the agency’s lawyers in litigation. 315 After all, it is unclear exactly what good the
reasons-giving requirement serves if the reasons stated need not be the actual reasons justifying the agency’s decision. In fact, the reasons-giving requirement in FOIA indicates that Congress wanted the agency, not the
court, to supply the reasons for the decision.316 Although not a formal delegation of interpretive authority as would invoke Chevron deference, this
reasons-giving requirement represents Congress’s assignment of responsibility in requiring agencies to articulate the basis for their own actions.
Moreover, FOIA administrative processing practices already meet this
statutory requirement. Currently, a typical response from an agency in
which it denies access to requested records contains a description of the
records withheld, including their quantity and length, and the exemption to
disclosure that is claimed as to each record or portion thereof.317 There is
also normally a very brief statement explaining why the claimed exemption
applies to the materials.318 Sometimes, response letters are much more detailed, but the typical letter has at least this much information. 319
Given FOIA’s existing procedures, applying Chenery would not require any further process or the development of a record at the agency level.
Instead, the agency would simply be limited to relying on the rationale that

314. See id. § 557 (enumerating requirements for decisions pertaining only to formal adjudications and exempting out informal adjudications). Informal rulemakings are subject to an explicit
reasons-giving requirement under the APA. See id. § 553(c) (“After consideration of the relevant
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose.”).
315. Stack, supra note 175, at 1008.
316. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (requiring agencies to provide FOIA requesters with reasons
for their determinations).
317. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13–14, Shannahan v. IRS, 680 F. Supp.
2d 1270 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. C08-0452JLR) (providing a copy of a request denial that details
the volume of withheld records and cites exemptions relied upon); Motion for Summary Judgment, exh. 4, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84782 (E.D.
La. 2010) (No. 09-6732-AJM-JCW) (providing a copy of a request denial which described a rationale for the application of exemption 4 to certain withheld records); Complaint, exh. 2,
Goodrich Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 593 F. Supp. 2d 184 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-1625-JDB) (providing a
copy of the request denial, which lists each withheld document and cites exemptions as to each);
Plaintiff’s Opposition and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, exh. H, Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 677 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 09-01054-JDB)
(providing a copy of a request denial that detailed the number of pages withheld and the exemptions claimed).
318. See GUIDE TO FOIA, supra note 68, at 93–94 (discussing the requirements the agency
must follow when preparing a FOIA denial letter, including making a reasonable effort to estimate
the amount of withheld material and must provide the reasons for the withholding).
319. Id.
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it articulated in the original denial letter when its decision is challenged in
court, and thus Chenery might incentivize the agency to respond more
thoughtfully at the outset. Although the agency should be limited not only
in the specific exemption claimed, but also in its reasoning for applying that
exemption, determining whether the agency has strayed too far from its
proffered rationale is not unlike the work courts already perform in determining whether an error is preserved for appeal. 320 The task is well suited
to the judiciary and does not constitute an overreaching into agency policy
matters.
The reasons-giving requirement in FOIA’s statutory text provides a
strong rationale for courts to adopt the Chenery principle as effectuating
Congress’s allocation of responsibility to the agencies to articulate the reasons for their actions. Without having to acknowledge the problematic deference practices in FOIA litigation, courts might even be able to rely exclusively on this provision to justify the application of Chenery.
2. Expertise
Chenery’s application to FOIA litigation is also justified by the reality
of deference given to agencies’ positions in FOIA litigation.321 Much of the
deference courts give in practice to agency positions in FOIA litigation is
premised on agencies’ officials exercising expertise in administering
FOIA. 322 Tellingly, spoken deference arises in areas typically within the
executive branch’s core—if not exclusive—purview, such as national security and law enforcement. 323 Spoken deference has also begun to appear in
areas that concern the agency’s own operations, such as the deliberative
process privilege. 324 The areas in which courts have expressly deferred to
agencies make clear that courts view the agency as exercising expertise that
should be respected. 325 Indeed, while agencies may not be viewed as having expertise in FOIA law per se, courts repeatedly treat agencies’ representations about the application of FOIA law to the agencies’ own records as
properly within the agencies’ competency. 326
One case decided by the D.C. Circuit contains a debate between the
majority and dissenting opinions that crystallizes the difference between al-

320. Cf. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 115–16 (2000) (comparing Chenery’s operation constraining agency arguments in litigation to waiver rules constraining litigants’ arguments on appeal).
321. Verkuil, supra note 12, at 730; Kwoka, supra note 21, at 196–200.
322. Kwoka, supra note 21, at 201.
323. See supra Part II.A. (synthesizing spoken deference doctrines).
324. See supra Part II.A. (synthesizing spoken deference doctrines).
325. Kwoka, supra note 21, at 211–12.
326. Id. at 201.
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lowing attorneys in litigation to form the agency’s position and respecting
the expertise of agency staff. In Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice, 327 the D.C. Circuit affirmed DOJ’s denial of a request
for the names of individuals detained on immigration charges and as material witnesses in the course of a post-September 11 investigation. 328 In so
doing, the court expressly deferred to the agency’s position that revealing
the identities of the detainees would interfere with the ongoing law enforcement investigation because the case involved matters of national security. 329 Judge David Tatel, dissenting, took issue not with the majority’s
decision to defer to the agency’s judgments, but with the particular representations to which the court deferred. 330 Specifically, he criticized the majority’s acceptance of a representation made in DOJ’s brief that, although
some identities of detainees had been made known, those disclosures were
made strategically so as not to impede the investigation. 331 As Judge Tatel
wrote:
While this may well be so, it is an argument of counsel, and
though the court accepts it, FOIA requires that the agency—not
counsel—explain such judgments under oath. The reason for this
requirement is clear: We owe deference to agency expertise, not
to lawyers defending the agency in litigation. If there are legitimate investigative reasons for releasing the names of some detainees, but not others, then [the agency official who did submit a
declaration] or others responsible for the terrorism investigation
should explain those reasons under oath—in an in camera affidavit, if necessary to protect the information—and that explanation
would probably warrant judicial deference.332
That is, deference is properly accorded to the reasoning articulated by
agencies, not to the positions taken by lawyers representing the agencies in
litigation. Although Judge Tatel did not address the additional question of
327. 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
328. Id. at 937. The court also affirmed the agency’s withholding of other information related
to the detainees, including circumstances of their arrest, detention, and representation by legal
counsel. Id.
329. See id. at 928, 932 (“[We] join the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that the
courts must defer to the executive on decisions of national security. In so deferring, we do not
abdicate the role of the judiciary. Rather, in undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize
the different roles underlying the constitutional separation of powers. It is within the role of the
executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security. It is not within the
role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in furtherance of that branch’s proper role.”). This is an example of spoken deference that arose under exemption 7 of FOIA, which
covers certain law enforcement records. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2012).
330. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 944 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
331. Id.
332. Id. (citations omitted).
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timing—that is, contemporaneous reasons versus post-hoc rationalizations—his position clearly demonstrates the danger of deference unconstrained by Chenery. 333 In Center for National Security Studies, the majority deferred to factual statements that were not even in the form of
admissible evidence, much less facts on which the agency relied to come to
its position that was under review. 334
As Chenery’s operation in other contexts makes clear, however, agency expertise is only respected if the lawyers must defend the agency’s actions based on the rationale provided by the agency at the time the decision
was made. 335 Thus, the courts defer not to a post-hoc litigator-crafted position, but to the professional staff of the agency charged with carrying out its
substantive work. 336 Setting aside the inappropriateness of any sort of deference in the FOIA context, it is doubly inappropriate to give deference to
the lawyers representing the agency in litigation who, after all, lack the subject-matter expertise that sits at the core of deferential standards of review. 337
Indeed, as FOIA litigation currently stands, agencies are represented
not by in-house lawyers, but by lawyers from the DOJ. 338 Without any
Chenery constraint, lawyers representing the agency in litigation are empowered to rely on any justification they feel may support the agency’s underlying decision, regardless of whether it is a justification the agency itself
would agree with or would have adopted. Those positions, as the reality of
FOIA litigation reveals, will receive both spoken and unspoken deference. 339
The notion that agency expertise is invoked in FOIA is also consistent
with a growing movement toward professionalizing FOIA officers, the
agency-level employees responsible for processing FOIA requests and issuing responses. Improving the administration of FOIA at the agency level

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 951–52.
Id. at 940.
Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1044.
Id. at 1043–44.
Id. at 1044.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE, NO. 3, FOIA LITIGATION REQUIRES
COORDINATION
(1985),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_VI_3/page1.htm (stating that the Department of Justice almost always represents the defendant agency on behalf of the government); see also Magill
& Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1060 (noting that most agencies are represented by the Department of Justice in litigation generally).
339. While it is true that an agency must submit affidavits to support its motion for summary
judgment or to oppose a requester’s motion for summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4), those
affidavits are often drafted by the lawyers representing the agency and, in any case, are directed to
be created by those lawyers in light of the legal strategy and positions the lawyers have decided
are most likely to prevail in court.
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was a key concern of FOIA reform legislation enacted in 2007.340 To that
end, one provision of the OPEN Government Act directed the Office of
Personnel Management (“OPM”) to conduct a study and submit a report to
Congress on whether and how to improve personnel policies to encourage
all federal employees generally to better comply with FOIA and, more specifically, to “enhance the stature of officials administering [FOIA] within
the executive branch.” 341 The provision went on to require OPM to consider whether a minimum pay scale for FOIA professionals should be established and whether there should be other changes to ensure a career track
with advancement possibilities for those officials. 342
While OPM’s subsequent report fell far short of advocates’ hopes, the
reaction it provoked demonstrates a concerted movement toward professionalization of personnel dedicated to FOIA administration. OPM reported to the Senate that addressing the stature of access professionals within
agencies should be left to the leadership of individual agencies, and not addressed through any executive-wide action. 343 It also recommended against
establishing a minimum rate of pay or additional advancement opportunities. 344 The American Society of Access Professionals (“ASAP”), the primary professional organization for FOIA and privacy personnel, immediately responded with a call for OPM to reconsider its position, calling its
initial letter a lost opportunity to increase the seriousness with which agency officials treat not only FOIA professionals, but also the overarching
goals of transparency those professionals are charged with administering. 345
The requester community, as represented by a group of twenty organizations and advocacy groups as well as prominent named individuals, made a
similar plea, noting OPM’s process for reaching its conclusions was woefully inadequate. 346

340. See generally Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007
(OPEN Government Act), Pub. L. No. 110–175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552) (containing various provisions addressing administrative performance under FOIA).
341. Id. § 11(1)(B), 121 Stat. at 2530.
342. Id.
343. Letter from Michael W. Hager, Acting Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., to Richard
Cheney,
President
of
the
Senate
1
(Dec.
16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/DMS%2015028%20Final.pdf.
344. Id. at 2–3.
345. Letter from Claire Shanley, Exec. Dir., Am. Soc’y of Access Prof’ls, to John Berry, Dir.,
U.S.
Office
of
Pers.
Mgmt.
(Apr.
27,
2009),
available
at
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/ASAP%20Response%20to%20OPM%20Final%2027%20Apr%202009%20doc.pdf.
346. Letter from The Nat’l Sec. Archive, et. al., to John Berry, Dir., U.S. Office of Pers.
Mgmt.
(June
3,
2009),
available
at
http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/otg/OPM%20Report%20letter-Final.pdf.

KwokaFinalBookProof

1108

5/14/2014 10:51 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:1060

These responses demonstrate an increase in focus on adequately rewarding the work of FOIA personnel and encouraging transparency through
greater professionalization. 347 In various contexts, researchers have found
that denials of FOIA requests most often stem from a lack of understanding
about the legal requirements of disclosure. 348 As one researcher found,
“[m]ost of the problems with the way records custodians respond to requests for government information encountered in this study might be alleviated in one way: standardized formal training.”349 ASAP offers a menu of
training opportunities, including its main annual training conference, directed at FOIA professionals. 350 These initiatives show, therefore, that
there exists an increased focus on fostering and rewarding expertise among
the agency-level personnel handling FOIA requests and issuing responses.
In addition to potentially exercising their expertise, agency officials
have the option to release records as a matter of discretion in many cases,
even if the records fall within an exemption to disclosure.351 That agencies
make discretionary determinations under FOIA invokes another key concern of administrative law: keeping agencies politically accountable. 352
Chenery promotes political accountability for decisionmaking by ensuring
that “agency policy [has] been embraced by the most politically responsive
and public actors within the agency,” rather than DOJ lawyers whose responsibility for decisionmaking is both attenuated and not transparent.353
Given that courts engage in both spoken and unspoken deference in
FOIA cases to the great advantage of agency defendants, at a minimum that
deference should be constrained by directing it at the relevant actors and the

347. See Melissa Davenport & Margaret B. Kwoka, Good But Not Great: Improving Access to
Public Records Under the D.C. Freedom of Information Act, 13 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 359, 382–83
(2010) (showing significant resistance, including letters from officials at the American Society of
Access Professionals, to an OPM report to Congress which stated that no changes to the professionalization of FOIA officers was necessary).
348. See, e.g., Michele Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Records Custodians’ DecisionMaking Behaviors in Response to Florida’s Public Records Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 351
(2003) (“This study showed that records custodians do not completely understand the provisions
of public records laws. As a result, records custodians are denying access to information that
should be available to the public.”); see also Davenport & Kwoka, supra note 347, at 384 (citing
Freedom of Information Amendment Act of 2000: Hearing on Bill No. 13-829 Before the Comm.
on Gov’t Operations, 13th. Per. 1 (D.C. 2000) (statement of Kathy Patterson, Councilmember and
Chair, Committee on Gov’t Operations, Council of the District of Columbia) (“[T]oo often front
line workers simply aren’t aware that the public has a clear right to public documents.”)).
349. Kimball, supra note 348, at 351.
350. Training and Educational Programs, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ACCESS PROFESSIONALS,
http://www.accesspro.org/programs/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
351. See supra text accompanying note 170.
352. Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law,
97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852–53 (2012).
353. Stack, supra note 175, at 993.

KwokaFinalBookProof

2014]

5/14/2014 10:51 AM

Deference, Chenery, and FOIA

1109

relevant rationales. 354 Chenery is the administrative law doctrine that has
the effect of locating power within the agency to the correct decisionmaker
and the rationale articulated at the time of the decision, which cabins the effect of deference so that agencies do not enjoy unconstrained deference.355
Without a shift to reinstate true de novo review in FOIA litigation, the
standard of review cannot serve as the justification for letting the government off the Chenery hook and allowing agencies to make new claims to
justify their withholdings under FOIA once litigation has commenced. The
inextricable link between deference to agency positions and requiring agencies to justify their decisions on the grounds contemporaneously articulated
calls for the application of Chenery to FOIA litigation.
III. IMPROVING GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY
Apart from whether Chenery’s application to FOIA litigation can be
justified, there remains the question of whether applying the Chenery principle in this context is desirable. Unquestionably, applying Chenery to
FOIA would constrain the deference courts give to agency positions and rebalance the litigation dynamic by allowing courts to reverse agency decisions to withhold records when they fail to fully justify their decisions in
their initial responses to requesters. 356 Because agencies would not be able
to advance new arguments in litigation, rather than being anomalously high,
reversal rates in FOIA cases might look like the reversal rates in other litigation reviewing agency decisions, representing more meaningful judicial
oversight. The application of Chenery would also prevent the sandbagging
problem that arises now (whether intentional or unintentional), in which the
agency may not advance its strongest arguments at the administrative level,
thereby leaving the requester in the dark as to the nature of the claims when
evaluating whether to bring a lawsuit, only to find out once in litigation that
the agency has an unbeatable argument. 357
Though these benefits in ensuring a more meaningful check on agency
secrecy seem clear cut, extending Chenery to FOIA is not without complication. Chenery is a controversial administrative law doctrine that has provoked some harsh criticism about its effect on the public’s rights, agency
administration, and judicial review. Most notably, critics argue that the

354. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 176, at 1044 (arguing that Chenery represents a
commitment to technical, nonlegal expertise within agencies).
355. See Stack, supra note 175, at 1008–10 (explaining Chenery as a constraint on deference).
356. See infra Part III.B. (explaining and citing support for the proposition that applying
Chenery to FOIA processes will appropriately constrain agency decisionmaking).
357. See supra Part II.A.2. Even critics of Chenery admit that it is relatively effective in preventing sandbagging. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 222, at 848 (noting that Chenery promotes
procedural fairness and protects against agency sandbagging).
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Chenery principle leads to inefficient proceedings and formalistic agency
responses to judicial reversals. 358 As explained in detail below, these criticisms, as a practical matter, simply do not have as much force with respect
to FOIA litigation as they do in other contexts.359 Moreover, because of the
way FOIA litigation proceeds, Chenery may offer some unique benefits. 360
A. Remands
One of the most pervasive critiques of Chenery concerns the operation
of Chenery remands. A court applying Chenery in refusing to consider a
new justification and reversing an agency’s action as insufficiently justified
will typically remand the matter to the agency for it to reconsider the matter
afresh. 361 As Chenery itself illustrates, Chenery remands may result in the
agency taking exactly the same position but advancing different reasons. 362
Thus, the plaintiff may have won the lawsuit, but may not receive any tangible relief at the end of the day. 363 Moreover, litigation may again ensue
over the agency’s newly offered rationale resulting in a back-and-forth litigation dynamic that has been compared to a game of Ping-Pong between
the agency and the courts. 364
By contrast, FOIA litigation as it currently stands avoids this inefficiency. In cases where the requester prevails and the agency’s justification
for withholding fails, courts order the release of the records to the requester
under FOIA. 365 The judicial decision thus ends the matter and does not remand the case to the agency to reconsider the question in light of the court’s
decision or invite the agency to come up with a new way of achieving the

358. See infra Part III.A (highlighting criticism of the Chenery principle based on its allowing
agencies to continue to promulgate the same policies, even after those policies have been rebuffed
by courts during judicial review); see also Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking Administrative Law’s
Chenery Doctrine: Lessons from Patent Appeals at the Federal Circuit, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
817, 861 (2013) (citing the significant inefficiencies inherent in the Chenery principle that, as
some scholars hypothesize, have led to ossification of the administrative state).
359. See infra Parts III.A–B (addressing the concerns about the Chenery principle and arguing
that they do not apply as strongly in the FOIA context).
360. See infra Parts III.A–B.
361. See Friendly, supra note 284, at 205–06 (discussing the characterization of the Chenery
principle “as upholding ‘the proposition that when an agency gives the wrong reasons for a decision . . . the reviewing court will send the case back for a new determination, even though the
court might have upheld the order if no reasons had been assigned’”).
362. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (upholding, after the initial
reversal and remand, the SEC’s identical decision not to approve the public holding utility’s reorganization plan because the SEC had provided a sustainable rationale).
363. Id. at 206–07.
364. Murphy, supra note 222, at 820.
365. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).
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same outcome. 366 A win for a FOIA requester is a full win under the current litigation regime. Because of this distinction, some hesitation is warranted before concluding that adopting Chenery in FOIA decisions would
help requesters regain some of the footing they have lost in the FOIA litigation dynamic.
Despite some drawbacks associated with Chenery remands, the potential gains for both FOIA litigants and overall government transparency outweigh the downsides of applying Chenery to FOIA. First, FOIA requesters
winning their cases outright under the current litigation regime are rare: only ten percent of requesters achieve this holy grail of litigation victory. 367
Indeed, FOIA decisions are affirmed far more than other administrative decisions. 368 The spoken and unspoken deference doctrines that have developed uniquely in FOIA jurisprudence, combined with the lack of a Chenery
constraint on agencies’ arguments, go a long way to explaining the government’s remarkably high success rate in FOIA litigation. 369 Thus, the
current regime results in very few requester wins.370
As numerous commentators have observed, judges often find themselves in seemingly difficult positions when adjudicating FOIA cases. 371
For instance, they must assess the government’s claims about national security interests and the potential dangers that might arise from releasing records. 372 If courts err in their assessment, judges fear that improperly released records might have devastating consequences. 373 The consequences
of erroneous release may not be as vividly illustrated in those cases not involving national security claims, but they are nonetheless considerable.
Wrongly released records could, for instance, compromise individuals’ per-

366. Id.; see also Green v. Dep’t of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating
that in a FOIA case a final decision “is an order by the District Court requiring release of documents by the Government to the plaintiff, or an order denying the plaintiff’s right to such release”).
367. Verkuil, supra note 12, at 734.
368. Zaring, supra note 22, at 169.
369. See supra Part II.A.
370. Verkuil, supra note 12, at 734.
371. See, e.g., Fensterwald v. CIA, 443 F. Supp. 667, 668 (D.D.C. 1977) (noting that the court
is in a difficult position in FOIA cases due to problems of proof and procedure, and because FOIA
litigation turns on “narrowly drawn factual determinations that are not the product of adversarial
give and take”); Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over
National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 89–90
(1992) (discussing problems facing courts reviewing FOIA cases concerning national security,
including the weight to give evidence and the procedures to be used to model the adversarial setting).
372. Fuchs, supra note 67, at 163.
373. See, e.g., Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that disclosure of
CIA research efforts “may compromise the Agency’s ability to gather intelligence as much as disclosure of intelligence sources”).
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sonal privacy rights or companies’ trade secrets.374 Moreover, because the
full adversarial process is not brought to bear in FOIA cases (albeit largely
as a result of unspoken deference doctrines created by the courts themselves), courts may feel ill equipped to judge many of the governments’
claims. 375 It is understandable that courts may err on the side of caution
when faced with a difficult decision. This is especially true when courts
perceive an error in favor of disclosure as risking a very tangible harm, but
see an error in favor of secrecy producing only a more ephemeral informational harm to a requester, which can in any case be reviewed by a higher
court.
The dilemma courts face, however, may partly be brought about by
FOIA’s strong medicine. The statute gives the district court “jurisdiction to
enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.”376
As FOIA litigation currently stands without the application of Chenery, all
arguments are considered and ruled upon with nothing left for the agency to
do after a judgment. Thus, the only two options are to uphold the agency’s
decision withholding the records from the requester or to order immediate
release of the records into the public domain under this statutory provision.
Were Chenery to apply, it would provide a third option: a “reversallite” approach. Because courts would only consider those justifications offered at the administrative level, it would have the option to reverse on
those justifications but remand to the agency for reconsideration. According to Judge Patricia Wald, a Chenery reversal “says ‘No’ to the agency, yet
gives it a second chance with the court’s guidance to reach the result it
thinks proper.” 377 If Chenery were applied and a reverse-and-remand for
reconsideration option were available, courts might be less reluctant to reverse agency decisions that are poorly supported. For this same reason,
even the same courts that have created the very deference that troubles
FOIA litigation may be attracted to a solution that increases their menu of
remedial options. Instead of ordering the release of contested records, the
court could remand to the agency with instructions to redo its own analysis.
This point is worth emphasizing: requesters would likely achieve more success and reversal rates might increase in FOIA cases if courts had more

374. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (6) (2012).
375. See, e.g., Fensterwald, 443 F. Supp. at 669 (explaining the difficulty of ruling on FOIA
claims, even when the court conducts in camera review of withheld records).
376. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
377. Patricia M. Wald, Keynote Address at the Section of Administrative Law Fall Meeting
(Oct. 1987), The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, in 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
507, 529 (1988).
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available remedial options, such as the reverse and remand that Chenery
provides. 378
Of course, a reverse and remand order does little good if the agency arrives at the same conclusion, but history demonstrates that remanding to the
agency is not necessarily an exercise in futility. As Judge Friendly described in a seminal article on the Chenery doctrine, Chenery usefully
“serves the ‘think-it-over’ function.” 379 Judge Friendly points to an example in which seven of the eight supplied reasons for a decision made by the
ICC about railroads were found by a court to be invalid and the decision
was reversed and remanded under Chenery. 380 The ICC then revisited the
decision and concluded its initial position was in error, and it reversed its
own initial action. 381 Emily Hammond has recently demonstrated in the
regulatory context that even when remands lead to serial litigation, benefits
accrue: “Courts and agencies engage in fruitful discussions that lead to better understanding of the issues and, ultimately, their resolution.”382 Although empirical evidence is mixed, some studies strongly suggest remands
often produce a change in agency position. For instance, two separate studies found that certain agencies made at least some policy changes in about
three-quarters of remanded cases.383 One study demonstrated major changes about forty percent of the time. 384
Without doubt, agencies often take a different approach. As in
Chenery, agencies may adopt the same position on remand as they did initially, and empirical evidence suggests agencies are apt to do so when regulatory schemes are at issue. 385 There is good reason to believe, however,

378. This conclusion is supported by empirical data. In other administrative review contexts,
Chenery is “one of the most common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.” Stack, supra
note 175, at 957 (citing Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1035 tbl. 6); Wald, supra note 377,
at 528.
379. Friendly, supra note 284, at 209.
380. Id. at 214; N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Bondholders Comm. v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418,
446 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
381. Friendly, supra note 284, at 214.
382. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1722, 1725 (2011). Emily Hammond Meazell now goes by Emily Hammond. See Faculty
Profiles –
Emily
Hammond,
WAKE FOREST UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
http://law.wfu.edu/faculty/profile/meazeleh/bio/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
383. ROBERT J. HUME, HOW COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 91
(2009).
384. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 378, at 1047 (describing the major changes finding with
regard to the post-remand process).
385. See William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 445 (2000) (concluding that agencies are still able to implement
their overall regulatory program even after a remand).
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that agencies are more apt to reach the same conclusion on remand in regulatory processes rather than adjudicatory processes such as FOIA. Rulemakings tend to embody agency policy goals set by high-ranking officials,
and after an investment of time and research considering the various options. 386 As reflections of the agency’s policy judgment, regulatory decisions tend to be more considered and planned than adjudications, which
tend to be more hurried, based on less extensive records, and made by lowlevel staff. 387 This distinction is especially true of informal adjudications
like decisions to withhold or disclose documents pursuant to FOIA because
they need not be decided through the formalized processes enumerated in
the APA. Consequently, agencies are likely not as wedded to these adjudicated positions as they are to the regulations that they have determined best
promote their policy objectives.388 In fact, as Judge Friendly noted, these
attributes of adjudicatory administrative proceedings may suggest a greater
need for “judicial enforcement of the requirement of reasoned decision”
through the Chenery principle. 389
In FOIA litigation, there is an additional reason agencies may choose
to change their position on remand: at the point of reconsidering the matter,
the only cost to the agency of avoiding another round of litigation is releasing the records. 390 In Chenery II, the court noted that after Chenery I, the
agency was “bound to deal with the problem afresh.” 391 There, however,
the result was that the agency had to go through another formalized process,
including a hearing, taking evidence, and drafting a new decisional document. 392 Agencies faced with Chenery remands in FOIA cases, by contrast,
may have more incentive to reevaluate their positions and to release records
because doing so is relatively costless and reaching the same conclusion
risks another round of litigation.
In fact, the Ping-Pong analogy, which is used to critique Chenery on
the grounds that it produces delay and ossification of agency process, is also
386. See Friendly, supra note 284, at 216 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of administrative law in the 1970s specifically).
387. See id. (noting that the application of Chenery to such cases could “be a blessing or a
curse”).
388. See Jordan, supra note 385, at 440 (giving an empirical account of agencies persevering
in attaining their policy objectives in the face of judicial reversals and remands).
389. Friendly, supra note 284, at 216.
390. In fact, it would be even more costless for the agency to change its position on releasing
records under FOIA when it does so on a Chenery remand than when it does so in litigation, because changing its position in litigation can result in an award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) (2012) (allowing an award of attorneys’ fees when a plaintiff
has substantially prevailed, and defining “substantially prevailed” to include “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial”).
391. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947).
392. See id. at 198–99 (describing the agency’s process after remand).
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less apt in the FOIA adjudication context. 393 Litigants challenging regulations, which tend to burden them with extra requirements, may benefit from
delay itself and thus use Chenery to effectuate a substantive outcome for a
period of time. 394 FOIA litigants, however, do not benefit from delay, and
thus have no incentive to use Chenery as a litigation weapon against the
agency. If anything, since Chenery is unidirectional, aggrieved individuals
under FOIA may be able to take advantage of it to enforce reasoned decisionmaking, but cannot use it to promote a litigation strategy alone. 395 Accordingly, Chenery remands, while seemingly a weak remedy (and without
a doubt a weaker remedy than the remedy of immediate release provided
under the statutory text of FOIA), nonetheless hold great promise for FOIA
requesters.
Another key benefit to requesters comes from Chenery remands, regardless of the agency’s subsequent actions: the judicial precedent rejecting
the agency’s claims of exemption. Because Chenery would empower
courts to reverse weak agency claims of withholding more often, courts
would be able to create strong precedent policing the boundaries of the exemptions, rather than watering them down so as to avoid what courts might
see as a risky result. The precedent would then bind not only future cases,
but also administrative processing of FOIA requests. 396
Finally, not all FOIA withholdings that are reversed by courts would
be remanded under Chenery. Courts would still be empowered under FOIA
to order the release of records, and the Chenery doctrine, over time, has
admitted to some flexibility 397 that could dictate when and how courts
should simply order release of records versus reverse and remand for fur393. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion) (addressing a critique of Chenery remands as creating a Ping-Pong game between the courts and the agency).
394. See Pieter M. Schenkkan, When and How Should Texas Courts Review Agency Rules?,
47 BAYLOR L. REV. 989, 1135 (1995) (observing that “many see judicial activism as a threat that
gives regulated industries, with their superior litigation resources, an additional means to delay or
defeat progressive regulation”).
395. See Friendly, supra note 284, at 216–17 (noting that “the prolonged process of reversal
and remand for failure to state reasons adequately and correctly would be peculiarly painful to
individuals needing quick relief and lacking the funds for protracted proceedings,” but that a “partial answer” can be found in that Chenery “will be invoked only when the agency has denied relief
to an individual or has proceeded against him for a wrong reason, not when it may have erred in
doing what he wanted”).
396. For instance, DOJ issues guidance to agencies to be used in processing FOIA requests
based on judicial interpretations of FOIA. See, e.g., DOJ Guide to the Freedom of Information
Act: Table of Contents, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2014).
397. Even the Supreme Court has at times strained the Chenery principle to accommodate
competing concerns and uphold the agency’s action. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (upholding an agency action on grounds other
than those articulated contemporaneously).
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ther consideration. 398 For instance, Chenery remands are inappropriate
when there is but one permissible outcome; as Judge Friendly explained, it
is a “scarcely questionable principle that when agency action is statutorily
compelled, it does not matter that the agency which reached the decision
required by law did so on a debatable or even a wrong ground, for remand
in such a case would be but a useless formality.” 399 This precedent, which
establishes a sort of “futility exception,” would justify a court in deciding
that release of records is mandated and order the agency to do so as FOIA
contemplates, and as courts are currently authorized to do. 400 Chenery
would simply present another option. In fact, one recent call for reform in
Chenery’s application would allow exactly this type of flexibility in courts’
application of the Chenery doctrine. 401 Indeed, requesters may well continue to win outright the ten percent of FOIA cases they currently win, given
how strong those cases have to be for the courts to overturn the agencies
under the current regime.
B. Administrative Decisionmaking
Chenery’s reason-giving requirement has been lauded as a method
through which to improve the administrative process itself, irrespective of
judicial review. 402 Requiring and holding the agency to a contemporaneous
justification motivates an agency to give the matter serious consideration at
the outset, documents agency rationales that may guide its actions in the future, and contributes to agency accountability. 403 Perhaps even more than
in other contexts, Chenery has great promise to improve the administrative
processing of FOIA requests and responses to the benefit of all requesters,
not just those requesters who later become litigants.
398. There may also be instances where courts should consider post-hoc rationales in FOIA
cases despite Chenery, such as when the application of an exemption could not have been asserted
at the time of the initial decision, but is available at the time of litigation. See, e.g., Frito-Lay v.
U.S. Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, 964 F. Supp. 236, 239 (W.D. Ky. 1997). In Frito-Lay,
the court noted that the agency invoked exemption 7(A), which covers certain law enforcement
records relating to a pending investigation, in responding to plaintiff’s request. Id. By the time
litigation commenced, the investigation was over, thereby eliminating that claim; however, another exemption, which would not have been available to plaintiff during the investigation, was now
appropriately invoked. Id.
399. Friendly, supra note 284, at 210. Friendly also argues that Chenery should not require
remand where it is clear that the agency would come to the same conclusion. Id. Other commentators have called this the “harmless error rule” in the Chenery context. See, e.g., Murphy, supra
note 222, at 864–68.
400. Cf. Levin, supra note 237, at 298–99 (explaining that key administrative law remedies
have admitted to flexibility when courts feel the practical consequences of strict enforcement
would be unduly disruptive).
401. See Murphy, supra note 222, at 876–77.
402. Stack, supra note 175, at 992–96.
403. Murphy, supra note 222, at 849–50.
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Stack’s linkage of Chenery to constitutional nondelegation norms also
illuminates the link between Chenery and better administrative decisionmaking generally. He contends that Chenery promotes rule-of-law values
because the reasons given for decisions made “have greater generality than
the outcomes they support, [and therefore] giving a reason typically implies
a commitment to outcomes falling within the reason’s scope.” 404 In turn, a
collection of decisions over time with articulated rationales, as Stack describes, “makes each agency action . . . a source of constraint for future actions.” 405 In this way, Chenery promotes nonarbitrariness in agency decisionmaking by spurring the agency to create a sort of common law for
itself. Judge Friendly notes that Chenery, apart from its outcome in particular cases, “should improve the administrative process” in this regard.406
As it currently stands, administrative processing of FOIA requests is
notoriously poor, making this processing perhaps the single biggest concern
regarding FOIA among advocates, Congress, and FOIA users. 407 Numerous reports show that delay, 408 over-withholding, 409 and nonresponsiveness 410 are rampant across agencies and FOIA offices. Congress has made
404. Stack, supra note 175, at 997.
405. Id. at 998.
406. Friendly, supra note 284, at 210.
407. See WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
(FOIA): BACKGROUND AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS 13–14, 16 (2013) (noting that use of some exemptions by agencies is growing and observing that “every Congress since
the 109th” has introduced “a bill entitled the Faster FOIA Act”); Administration of the Freedom of
Information Act: Current Trends: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Information Policy, Census,
and National Archives of the H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 41–
50 (2010) (statement of Larry F. Gottesman, Nat’l FOIA Officer, EPA) (testifying that the EPA
took aggressive steps to decrease the backlog of FOIA requests, including revising procedures and
processes, and deploying updated information technology tools).
408. See Nate Jones, The Rubber Hasn’t Met the Road. Response to the Department of Transportation’s Letter to the Washington Post, NSA ARCHIVE (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/03/23/the-rubber-hasnt-met-the-road-response-to-thedepartment-of-transportations-letter-to-the-washington-post/ (noting that the average response
time for a simple FOIA request to the Department of Transportation is 141 days); see also NAT’L
SEC. ARCHIVE, JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED 1 (2003), available at
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB102/tenoldest.pdf (finding that as of 2003,
the oldest FOIA requests dated back to the 1980s); Press Release, Public Citizen, Despite Progress
in Transparency, Obama Administration Still Slow to Act on Freedom of Information Requests
(Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3084 (finding that,
while the Obama Administration has increased its efforts toward greater government transparency,
FOIA delays and backlogs still persist); FOIA’s 40th Anniversary – Bigger Backlogs and Poor
Planning, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (July 11, 2006), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2988
(finding that FOIA’s backlogs have been increasing).
409. Sam Kim, FOIA Performance Goes from Bad to Worst, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T
(Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3411 (noting a rise in denials of information).
410. Lauren Harper, Why Agencies Should Not be Allowed to Lie About FOIA Requests, NSA
ARCHIVE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/foia-what-is-it-good-
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various legislative efforts to reform administrative processing in response to
these problems. For instance, in the 2007 OPEN Government Act, Congress established the position of “FOIA Liaison” in each agency, a position
dedicated to serving the public by answering concerns about their FOIA requests and assisting in the resolution of disputes about request processing. 411 Congress also mandated individualized tracking numbers for
requests 412 and created penalties for agency delays. 413
Moreover, all but a tiny fraction of FOIA denials are ever challenged
in court, making the administrative process the final word on almost every
FOIA request. 414 Improving the administrative processing of FOIA requests is, therefore, crucial to improving FOIA as a tool for government
transparency. Chenery’s effect of incentivizing more resources to be spent
at the agency level in this context would be a net benefit to all FOIA requesters, and therefore serve to increase government transparency. 415 Promoting reasoned decisionmaking at the front-end is far more effective in the
FOIA context than back-end corrections by the courts. Moreover,
Chenery’s promise in the FOIA context may be even greater than in other
contexts in which agencies have more built-in incentives to invest in the
administrative process.
IV. CONCLUSION
FOIA litigation has proven to be a far more feeble bulwark against
governmental attempts to conduct its affairs in secret than Congress envisioned. As deference has crept into FOIA jurisprudence and agencies have
been subjected to less and less judicial oversight, affirmance rates in FOIA
cases are among the highest of any type of administrative action reviewed
in federal court. Compounding the problem, the deference that courts give

for%E2%80%A6if-the-justice-department-has-its-way/ (reporting on a problem of agencies falsely responding that records responsive to a FOIA request do not exist).
411. Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007 (OPEN Government Act), Pub. L. 110–175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
412. Id. § 7.
413. See id. § 6(b) (instituting a penalty in the form of barring the agency from collecting certain fees from requesters).
414. In fiscal year 2011, 644,165 FOIA requests were made, resulting in 438,638 final agency
decisions, 202,164 of which denied access either to all of the requested records or at least some
portion of them at the administrative level. What Is FOIA?: FOIA Data at a Glance—FY 2008
through FY 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.foia.gov (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). Over
the last thirty years, however, only about three hundred to five hundred lawsuits challenging agency denials are decided by the courts each year. See Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/landing.jsp (select “Find & Analyze
Data,” then search for “federal judicial center integrated database”) (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
415. See Stack, supra note 175, at 971. Stack notes that Chenery “increases the resources that
agencies must devote to explaining the decisions they make.” Id.
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to agencies in FOIA litigation is not constrained by Chenery’s requirement
that the agency justify its action on the rationale offered at the time the decision was made rather than post hoc. So long as courts continue to defer to
agency decisions to withhold government documents rather than apply the
true de novo review standard explicitly required by the statute, Chenery’s
application to FOIA litigation promises to even the playing field between
agencies and requesters. Moreover, applying Chenery may push reversal
rates in FOIA litigation closer to the norm across administrative law, restore
litigation as a means to check agency secrecy, and improve administrative
processing of FOIA requests even for those requesters who will never litigate a denial of information access.

